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This three-paper thesis explores the important relationship between arbitrage and
price eciency. Chapter 3 investigates the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs
under varying degrees and types of risk. A novel stochastic process is introduced
to the literature that is capable of jointly capturing fundamental risk factors which
are absent from extant specications. Using stochastic optimal control theory, the
degree to which arbitrageurs' investment behaviour is aected by aversion to these
risks is analytically characterized, as well as conditions under which arbitrageurs
cut losses, eectively exacerbating pricing disequilibria. Chapter 4 explores the
role of arbitrage in enforcing price parity between cross-listed securities. This
work employs an overlooked mechanism by which arbitrage can maintain parity,
namely pairs-trading, which is cheaper to implement than the mechanism most
commonly employed in the literature on cross-listed securities. This work shows
that arbitrage is successful at enforcing parity between cross-listed securities, and
also documents the main limits to arbitrage in this market setting. Chapter 5
examines the extent to which arbitrage contributes to the ow of information
across markets. It is shown that microscopic lead/lag relationships of the order
of a few hundred milliseconds exist across three major international index futures.
Importantly, these delays last long enough, and induce pricing anomalies large
enough, to compensate arbitrageurs for appropriating pricing disequilibria. These
results accord with the view that temporary disequilibria incentivise arbitrageurs
to correct pricing anomalies.6
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Arbitrage and Statistical Arbitrage
Arbitrage is dened by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) as \the simultaneous purchase
and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in two dierent markets for
advantageously dierent prices".
The basic concept of arbitrage is simple: In perfectly ecient markets, if two
assets command identical cash ows, then the two should be identically priced.
Specically, any discrepancy between the two prices which exceeds the transaction
costs associated with executing the trades will immediately be arbitraged away.
Arbitrage has the eect of enforcing price parity and of bringing prices back to
fundamental values. It is therefore extremely important to the eld of Financial
Economics to understand the role played by arbitrageurs (those who engage in
arbitrage activities) in nancial markets.
The idea of statistical arbitrage is a generalization of its traditional \riskless"
interpretation. Unlike the traditional interpretation, statistical arbitrage
identies mispricings based on deviations from common stochastic trends, and
relies on a predictive modelling framework that attempts to exploit consistent
regularities in the movements of asset prices. Because the assets involved in a
statistical arbitrage trade are often not perfect substitutes, arbitrage of this type
will necessarily entail a degree of risk.
In a frequently-cited paper, Gatev et al. (2006) examine the risk and return
characteristics of a popular statistical arbitrage strategy with at least a 30-year20
history on Wall Street, namely pairs trading. The authors dene pairs trading
as nding \two stocks whose prices have moved together historically. When the
spread between them widens, short the winner and buy the loser. If history
repeats itself, prices will converge and the arbitrageur will prot". Other
examples of statistical arbitrage strategies are volatility arbitrage, convertible
arbitrage, and trading based on lead-lag eects.
In this thesis, the wider concept of statistical arbitrage as it is dened above
is referred to as either arbitrage or statistical arbitrage, whereas the traditional
riskless interpretation is referred to as pure arbitrage or direct arbitrage.
1.2 Scope
This thesis answers three main questions surrounding the role of arbitrageurs in
enforcing pricing eciency: First, to what extent does aversion to fundamental
risk diminish the extent to which arbitrageurs are willing to correct pricing
disequilibria? Second, in the absence of fundamental risk, how eective is
arbitrage at exploiting pricing anomalies? Third, to what extent does arbitrage
appropriate geographical informational delays between exchanges?
This thesis contributes to the state of the art by focussing on the incentives
and disincentives faced by arbitrageurs in a diverse range of market settings.
The work presented here adopts a bottom-up perspective from the point of view
of arbitrageurs, principally by way of trading exercises in a range of dierent
markets. It is therefore quantitative in nature.
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical contribution to the literature by introducing a
novel stochastic model of mispricing time-series aimed at exploring an important
aspect of arbitrage trading, namely fundamental risk. Fundamental risk denotes
the risk of a breakdown in the pricing relationship between two or more assets
which are the subject of a statistical arbitrage trade. This risk is an important21
consideration for arbitrageurs, but has only been represented qualitatively in
the extant literature. The work presented here oers the rst quantitative
incorporation of this risk into an explicit trading strategy, and in so doing yields
new insights into the behaviour of arbitrageurs: First, arbitrageurs who are
averse to fundamental risk approach increasingly large mispricings with increased
scepticism - a fact which explains why sometimes a number of \obvious" arbitrage
trades go underexploited. Second, an arbitrageur who is averse to fundamental
risk will unwind losing positions far sooner than an arbitrageur who is only averse
to the uncertainty of the lifetime of the trade but who has complete condence
in the fundamental pricing relationship between the assets being traded.
Chapter 4 provides an empirical contribution to the literature by way of a
pairs-trading exercise aimed at exploiting deviations from the Law of One Price
in the market for American Depository Receipts. By focussing on this market,
the analysis presented in chapter 4 explores the capacity of arbitrage to enforce
price eciency in a setting with virtually no fundamental risk - a setting which
intuitively should constitute fertile ground for arbitrageurs. Interestingly, it is
found that even when arbitrageurs face no fundamental risk, they are averse to
the uncertainty surrounding the duration of arbitrage trades. Furthermore, in
settings where the main impediments to arbitrage are the costs associated with
establishing the arbitrage position, protable trading opportunities are limited
to market participants who can execute trades quickly and cheaply, such as large
hedge funds and proprietary trading desks at investment banks. On the whole,
the work presented in this chapter nds, in contrast to the prior literature, that
arbitrage is highly successful at appropriating pricing disequilibria, and hence is
an important component of the price-correction mechanism related to deviations
from the Law of One Price.
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by applying an existing statistical
methodology of measuring lead-lag relationships to a new empirical setting22
namely the futures markets. The methodology applied has its roots in Hayashi
and Yoshida (2005), but the precise implementation is based on a recent advance
by Homan et al (2010). The analysis draws inspiration from a body of literature
documenting an increase in geographical correlation in global markets. However,
the question of whether informational delays across international markets give rise
to arbitrage opportunities is relatively under-explored. This chapter addresses
this gap by way of a trading exercise across international index futures. It is
found that such temporal disequilibria occur mainly in the sub-second space,
and moreover, arbitrage is successful at appropriating these disequilibria across
markets. Hence, arbitrage is an important mechanism in the transmission of
information across global markets.
This thesis borrows ideas from a variety of academic disciplines, ranging from
Optimal Control Theory, Statistics, and Empirical Finance; and presents a
synthesis of these elds to facilitate a reection on the research questions which
it tackles.
1.3 Motivation
This thesis is driven by the need for a deeper understanding of the role that
arbitrageurs play in nancial markets, and how that role relates to pricing
eciency.
The emphasis on arbitrage trading exercises from a protability point of view
is underrepresented in the literature, and yet is crucial to achieving deeper
understanding of the role of arbitrage for four main reasons: First, understanding
the conditions under which arbitrageurs are incentivised to exploit pricing
ineciencies from a quantitative perspective is fundamental to understanding
the extent to which pricing eciency can be restored by their actions. Second,
while it is widely reported in a deep body of literature documenting the \limits23
to arbitrage" that factors such as risks and costs can deter arbitrageurs from
exploiting ineciencies, the philosophy espoused in this thesis is that the precise
nature of how these factors act as limits to arbitrage is best understood by way of
a quantitative treatment of the subject. Third, placing emphasis on arbitrageurs
trading behaviour necessitates a careful treatment of the trading costs faced in
undertaking a real-world exploitation of pricing ineciencies. Such a careful
treatment of trading costs is absent from much of the relevant literature, and the
work presented here illustrates the importance of incorporating realistic trading
costs to drawing accurate conclusions which link arbitrage with market eciency.
Fourth, undertaking a trading exercise necessitates the utilization of high-quality
market data in drawing robust conclusions. The view adopted in this thesis is that
advances in computational technology have enhanced the ability of arbitrageurs
to explore and exploit regularities in prices. Yet it is relatively uncommon for
works written before the early 2000's to employ intraday data at all, or intraday
data that is granular enough to illustrate the competitive and short-lived nature
of arbitrage opportunities.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The principal aim of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the role
that arbitrageurs play in enforcing price eciency. To this end, each chapter
examines the role of arbitrage within a dierent market setting.
Chapter 3 analytically solves the portfolio optimization problem of an investor
faced with a risky arbitrage opportunity (e.g. relative mispricing in equity pairs).
This chapter introduces a nonlinear generalization of the commonly-employed
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process as a way to explicitly incorporate fundamental
risk into the mispricing time-series a feature absent from the extant literature.
Fundamental risk is the risk that mispricings can exhibit long and persistent24
departures from economic fundamentals. Incorporating fundamental risk yields
several novel insights regarding the investment behaviour of arbitrageurs: First,
arbitrageurs who are averse to fundamental risk exhibit a diminishing propensity
to exploit increasingly large mispricings. Second, investment behaviour in light of
these additional risk factors precipitates the gradual unwinding of losing trades
far sooner than is suggested by current models. In practice, the nonlinear
generalization yields superior risk-management capabilities relative to OU, when
applied empirically to FTSE 100 stock data.
Chapter 4 investigates the mechanism by which the Law of One Price is enforced
between UK shares and their American Depository Receipt (ADR) counterparts:
the two are virtually the same asset. This work is motivated by observations in
the empirical literature that markets for cross-listed securities are less than fully
integrated. In theory, environments such as this should constitute fertile ground
for arbitrageurs, who are compensated for exploiting these disequilibria. However,
the existing literature on stock-ADR arbitrage overwhelmingly concludes in
favour of market eciency, precluding the possibility of arbitrage. The reason
for this is that the literature examining stock-ADR arbitrage typically relies on
a trading strategy whereby stocks are physically converted into ADRs, and vice
versa. This chapter explores the ecacy of pairs trading, a strategy that is
under-represented in the literature within the context of ADRs, in enforcing
price parity. It is found that pairs trading yields statistically signicant returns
after adjusting for taxes and costs. This chapter concludes that arbitrage is
an important component of restoring stock-ADR parity, contrasting previous
assertions that trading in either the US or domestic market alone results in
ecient ADR pricing.
Chapter 5 employs a recent advance in the statistical estimation of correlation and
uncovers the existence of sub-second lead/lag relationships across international
index futures. The methodology is based on work by Hayashi and Yoshida25
(2005) and Homan et al (2010), and is chosen for its ability to handle the
nonsynchronous nature of price observations which is typical of sub-second data.
It is found that lead-lag eects across futures contracts last long enough, and
induce pricing anomalies large enough, to compensate arbitrageurs for exploiting
pricing disequilibria. This chapter concludes that arbitrage is an important
mechanism in the transmission of information across international markets.
1.5 Relevance of this Thesis
This thesis focusses on the explicit incentives and deterrents to arbitrage directly
from the point of view of arbitrageurs. In so doing, it oers a fuller understanding
of the relation between arbitrage and price eciency. This work may be useful
to researchers who wish to quantitatively explore arbitrage within other contexts
- for example the role of arbitrage trading in market contagion (an example of
which is the collapse of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1998) or
agent-based models of arbitrageurs with heterogeneous characteristics. It would
be important in the latter context to incorporate one of the central insights of
this thesis, which is that arbitrageurs' behaviour is substantially aected not only
by the extent, but also by the types of risk to which they are averse.
Further, this work highlights the important role arbitrage plays within market
settings in which it was previously concluded that arbitrage played little part
in the parity enforcement mechanism. Arbitrage is successful at eliminating
cross-border deviations from the Law of One Price and at appropriating
informational delays across geographies. These observations are relevant to the
regulatory debate surrounding the role of arbitrageurs in nancial markets.
Finally, because the concepts presented in this thesis are illustrated via the
development of explicit trading rules, these parts of the thesis may be useful
to market practitioners who engage in arbitrage trading. In particular, the26
ideas presented could be useful to the development of novel quantitative trading
strategies and to the choice of markets on which they are deployed.27
Chapter 2
A Review of the Relevant Literature
2.1 - Introduction
The overall aim of this chapter is to summarize our current understanding of the
important relationship between arbitrage and pricing eciency, with the intention
of exposing gaps in this understanding. This chapter is split into four subsequent
sections, which combine together to achieve the overall aim. Section 2.2 presents
a history of the debate between arbitrage and market eciency, then presents
examples from empirical works which document the existence of deviations from
price parity in nancial markets. Section 2.3 complements this discussion by
summarizing the body of literature that documents various impediments that act
to preclude arbitrageurs from enforcing price eciency the so-called \limits to
arbitrage". Section 2.4 reviews the theoretical literature on the quantication of
arbitrage risks and the establishment of arbitrageurs optimal trading rules from
a quantitative perspective. Section 2.5 summarizes the emergent gaps in the
literature that this thesis addresses. In all, this chapter provides the framework
upon which the contributions of this thesis are based.
2.2 - On the Existence of Pricing Ineciencies
Friedman (1953) was the rst to argue against the plausible existence of prolonged
mispricings away from fundamental values. Such deviations from price parity
amount to free money left on the table - a reward to those who subsequently
bring prices back into line. Though the origins of the relationship between price
and fundamental value are evident in writings as early as Hume (1741), it was28
Friedman (1953) who characterized the basic mechanism by which arbitrage acts
to correct prices within the context of capital asset markets. The author splits
the universe of investors into two groups: irrational traders who trade based
on measures other than fundamental values (e.g. mistaken beliefs about future
utility, chartists); and rational traders who act to exploit dierences between
prices and fundamental values. In this setting, irrational traders cannot have a
substantial eect on prices for two main reasons: First, any mispricing caused
by the actions of irrational traders will be immediately exploited by rational
arbitrageurs who prot from appropriating this mispricing. Second, the failure
of rational agents to correct mispricings is nevertheless tantamount to market
participants \buying high and selling low", an environment in which irrational
traders would eventually die out.
Closely related to the above concept is the assertion that past prices cannot
contain information about future prices, an idea termed \The Random-Walk
Hypothesis", which was rst modelled by French mathematician Louis Bachelier
(Bachelier, 1900) in his PhD Thesis \The Theory of Speculation". In a seminal
paper that has become the cornerstone for proponents of this theory, Fama (1965)
carries out the rst examination of the validity of this model, and nds strong
empirical support for the Random-Walk Hypothesis. This result is the basis of
what is known as the Ecient Markets Hypothesis; and asserts that one cannot
consistently achieve returns in excess of average market returns on a risk-adjusted
basis (except through luck), given the information available at the time the
investment is made. In other words, the Ecient Markets Hypothesis states
that the market is \informationally ecient", such that prices properly reect
all available information and are equal to fundamental values. Further work that
supports the implications of the Ecient Markets Hypothesis is Fama (1991),
Fama and French (1992), Fama (1995).29
The Ecient Markets Hypothesis may appear to be inconsistent with the
existence of arbitrage opportunities asserted by Friedman (1953), but the
two stipulations are reconcilable in an environment where arbitrageurs react
instantaneously to any mispricing caused by irrational investors.
Despite the intuitive nature of these early market models, there is a paradox
underlying their assertions. Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) take exception
to validity of the Ecient Markets Hypothesis, and base their counter-arguments
on the notion that arbitrage is costly since resources must be expended on
the collection of (private) information. If prices fully reect all available
information, then all arbitrage prots are necessarily eliminated. Therefore,
there is no incentive for arbitrageurs (who the authors equate to \rational
investors") to remain in the market. This creates a paradox whereby on the one
hand, arbitrageurs prot from instantaneously exploiting disequilibria caused by
irrational traders, but on the other hand, arbitrageurs make no prots. Indeed,
if the payo to the costly activity of collecting information is less than the value
of the costs, then there is no incentive to trade. Grossman and Stiglitz (1976,
1980) conclude that the only solution to this paradox is for nancial markets to
exhibit \an equilibrium level of disequilibrium" that incentivises arbitrageurs to
restore price parity.
There is a wide body of empirical literature which supports the view that prices
can signicantly diverge from fundamental values. The remainder of this section
presents several real-world examples of this phenomenon in a range of market
settings relevant to this thesis. In the subsequent section, a discussion is presented
as to why such mispricings exist, and how they might reconcile with the Ecient
Markets Hypothesis.30
2.2.1 Deviations from the Law of One Price
Fundamental to the notion of ecient markets is the concept of the Law of One
Price, which conveys the intuitive idea that identical goods (in separate markets)
should command identical prices. Arbitrage is a key driver of the Law of One
Price (De Long et al (1990), Gromb and Vayanos (2010)).
In a hypothetical example wherein (identical) coee beans are sold on two
dierent continents, any price dierential between the two markets which exceeds
the cost of physically transporting the coee represents price ineciency. In this
situation, arbitrageurs are nancially incentivised to purchase the coee in the
cheaper location, transport it to, and sell onto the dearer market. This arbitrage
trade has the eect of creating excess demand in the cheaper market, and of
creating excess supply in the dearer market, which in turn forces prices in each
of the two markets to converge. But despite the logical intuitiveness of the above
theoretical example, there are instances in real nancial markets where the Law
of One Price is violated for extended periods of time.
Lamont and Thaler (2003b) present a case-study of the Palm-3Com equity
carve-out (spin o). In March 2000, 3Com sold 5% of its stake in Palm through an
IPO, and further announced that its remaining stake would be spun o to 3Com
shareholders by the end of the year 2000. 3Com shareholders would receive 1.525
Palm shares for each share of 3Com they owned.
From the perspective of the Law of One Price, the price of 3Com shares should
have had a minimum bound of 1.525 times the price of Palm. This is because
each 3Com share was equivalent to 1.525 Palm shares plus a claim on 3Com's
non-Palm future cash ows. Because of limited liability, this cash ow claim is
non-negative. However, on the date of the IPO, Palm closed at $95.06 per share,
implying a minimum price of $144.97 per 3Com share. However, 3Com closed
at $81.81, having dropped from $104.13 on the previous day. In all, 3Com went31
from a 28% discount to a 41% discount in a clear violation of the Law of One
Price.
Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), and De Jong et al. (2009)
show that signicant mispricings can exist in dual-listed companies (DLCs).
DLCs are companies which issue shares on two or more exchanges in separate
countries. These shares have either identical cashows, or arrangements that set
out clearly the cashow terms that investors in each market are entitled to. Either
way, a clear pricing relationship exists between the dierent classes of shares for
these companies. Examples of such companies are Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever,
and BHP Billiton.
Both Rosenthal and Young (1990) and Froot and Dabora (1999) nd that
signicant mispricings in three DLCs (Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, and
Smithkline Beecham) have existed over a long period of time. Both studies
conclude that factors such as currency risk, legal structures, and taxation) do
not adequately explain the magnitude of the price deviations. Froot and Dabora
(1999) show that the relative prices of the twin stocks are correlated with the
stock indices of the markets on which each of the twins has its main listing. For
example, if the UK market rises relative to Amsterdam, then the stock price
of Reed International PLC would tend to rise relative to Elsevier NV (the two
names refer to the same company). De Jong et al. (2009) study a sample of 12
dual listed companies. The authors nd that, after adjusting for costs, margin
requirements, and taxes, returns to a simple arbitrage strategy yields 10% per
annum.
Shleifer (1986) and Chen (2004) investigate the eect on stock prices on the stocks
inclusion or exclusion from an index. Chen (2004) studies the period 1989-2000,
and nds that on average, a stocks price would rise by 5.5% on the day of the
announcement that it would be added to the S&P index. Furthermore, the price
of that same stock would rise a further 3.5% from the date of the announcement32
until the day it is actually added. On the other hand, a stocks price would fall
by an average of 14% from the day it is announced that it would be removed
from an index, to the actual date of removal. It is clear that these eects are
economically signicant.
A similar concept to a stock index is a closed-end fund. One type of closed-end
fund is a country fund. Country funds are exchange-traded closed-end investment
companies that hold portfolios of equities of particular foreign countries. They
do not attempt to time the market or achieve returns superior to the market for
their investors. Rather, they allow investors the opportunity to gain exposure to
the countries that the funds represent, while oering investors the convenience
of trading in their local market. Most country funds are denominated in dollars,
and trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Klibano et al. (1998)
highlight the growing popularity of this kind of investment vehicle. The authors
state that in 1984, only four US-listed country funds existed, whereas by 1995,
this number had grown to 54, each specializing in one of 30 countries.
Like most closed-end funds that trade on an exchange, country funds do exhibit
premiums or discounts relative to the equities that constitute the fund portfolio.
Managers of closed-end funds maintain pricing parity with the underlying basket
by constantly tuning the supply of \units" of the fund in the market against the
demand shocks generated in its constituent equities. For example, if the fund
is trading at a premium, the fund manager issues and sells additional shares
in the fund, and vice versa. Nevertheless, discounts and premia on closed-end
funds contradict the notion of market eciency. Klibano et al. (1998) study
a sample of 39 single-country funds and nd evidence of signicant mispricings.
For example, in 1990, the premium on the German country fund traded in New
York reached in excess of 100 percent. The authors make a further nding: during
periods where unexpected news permeates through markets, the prices of country
funds react much more quickly and fully in incorporating the news informational33
content; whereas during periods of relative calm, country funds exhibit greater
(temporary) mispricings. There are further examples of works which document
premia and discounts in closed-end funds. Hardouvelis et al. (1994) also nd
evidence of mispricings in country funds, while Malkiel (1977) and Lee et al.
(1991) document evidence of mispricings in the general class of closed-end funds
beyond just country funds.
Futures contracts are derivative instruments which speculate on the future price
of a particular stock index or commodity. Figlewski (1984), Stoll and Whaley
(1990), and Brennan and Schwartz (1990) are the earliest works which study the
pricing eciency of futures contracts relative to their underlying index. Brennan
and Schwartz (1990) study a sample of 16 index futures contracts over a period
of four years during 1983-1987, and document evidence of violations from the
spot-futures relationship. The spot futures relationship is a pricing relationship
between a futures contract, and the index or commodity on which it is based.
In Cummings and Frino (2011), the authors examine mispricings between the
Australian Stock Index (ASX) and its associated futures contract. The authors
nd, in contrast to the earlier studies, that futures contracts are eciently priced
relative to the ASX. Brooks et al. (2001) study the pricing relationship between
the futures contract and index in the UK market, and nd evidence that the
futures contract leads the stock market index. However, their results accord with
Cummings and Frino (2011), in the sense that this lead/lag relationship is not
exploitable, and does not present a violation of ecient pricing.
2.2.2 Depository Receipts
Introduced by the investment bank JP Morgan in 1927 as a way for US investors
to diversify their holdings internationally, American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
are a dollar-denominated representation of ownership in a non-US company. They34
trade as conventional shares on US exchanges, and provide identical cashows as
their corresponding underlying shares.
From the point of view of arbitrage, ADRs represent a very interesting market.
Because ADRs and their underlying stocks are virtually the same instrument, one
would expect that arbitrageurs would be very active in this market. Furthermore,
ADRs are two-way convertible, or \fungible", into their underlying stocks. This
eliminates a signicant portion of risk from an arbitrage trade.
Several works exist which document the returns to arbitrage in this setting.
Suarez (2005) analyses 10 French stocks that also trade as American Depository
Receipts (ADRs) in New York. The author employs a direct arbitrage technique,
wherein upon observing a mispricing (let us suppose the stocks are underpriced),
the arbitrageur will buy the stocks, which are converted to ADRs through the
depository custodian bank. The ADRs are then sold onto the US market to
realize the prot stemming from the initial price dierential. The largest banks
that oer DR conversion services are JP Morgan and Bank of New York Mellon.
Suarez (2005) nds that in a period of 11 months, an arbitrageur can extract
USD 70,000 from the given sample of stock-ADR pairs. The author compares
this prot to the opportunity cost of hiring a nancial expert to monitor this
market.
The above result shows that although arbitrage opportunities do exist in this
market, they yield a relatively modest level of prot. Moreover, Suarez (2005) is
a rare example in the literature that documents any protability from stock-ADR
arbitrage. The seminal work of Maldonado and Saunders (1983) and Rosenthal
(1983) nd that costs are too prohibitive for arbitrage to be a worthwhile pursuit
in this market. Miller and Morey (1996) analyse 3 months of high-frequency
intraday data for Glaxo-Wellcome, a UK company which is now known as
GlaxoSmithKline. The authors nd that the mispricing time-series between the
Glaxo-Wellcome stock and its ADR lies within the transaction cost bound of35
executing a successful arbitrage trade at all times throughout their sample. The
authors conclude that the market for cross-listed stocks is ecient.
The above results are surprising: If this market in theory provides such fertile
ground for arbitrageurs, why is it that arbitrage is unprotable? One plausible
explanation is that both domestic and US markets on which the ADRs trade
are fully integrated. However, evidence from the works of Werner and Kleidon
(1996) and Chen et al. (2009) suggest otherwise. By observing distinct U-shaped
volatility patterns in the prices of UK stocks and their ADRs, these works
conclude that investors in each of the two markets are segmented, which implied
that investors do not base their trading decisions solely on the cheaper location
to trade.
The works of Hong and Susmel (2003) and Broumandi and Reuber (2012) apply
a pairs-trading strategy to the market for ADRs. Hong and Susmel (2003) nd
signicant protability in the market for Asian ADRs. However, the authors
do not consider the transaction costs associated with executing the trades.
Furthermore, the authors use daily data, whereas the Asian and US stock markets
do not share any overlap. Gagnon and Karloyi (2010) point out that illusory
mispricings in this setting are inevitable, due to the inevitable variation in price
between the close of each market.
2.2.3 Lead/Lag Relationships
Lead/Lag relationships are induced when the prices of highly correlated securities
do not move in perfect contemporaneity. The seminal research of Zeckhauser
and Niederhoer (1983) was the rst to document the possibility of lead/lag
relationships between stock indices and futures contracts. Kawaller (1987)
provides evidence that US futures prices tend to lead stock indices with a lag
time of around 45 mins. The work of Herbst et al. (1987) and Stoll and Whaley
(1990) documents that futures prices lead stock indices by around 8 mins.36
The notion that futures prices lead stock indices is intuitive: Futures contracts
tend to be highly liquid, much more so than any of the constituent stocks that
comprise the index on which the futures contract is based. Information arriving
into the market can reasonably be expected to aect the futures price rst. As
Brooks et al. (2001) point out, stock indices can only reect information when
every single constituent of the index observes a price change. Interestingly, the
authors in Brooks et al. (2001) show a sharp decrease in the duration of the lag
in the spot/futures relationship. This is likely due to the advent of algorithmic
trading and technological infrastructure since the seminal works were written.
Although one would expect that the lead/lag relationship between futures and
indices would induce arbitrageurs to be active in this setting, there is little
evidence in the extant literature of any protable disequilibria. Brooks et al.
(2001) achieve a 65% forecasting accuracy of futures contracts over stock indices
in the UK market, but nd no evidence of exploitable temporal mispricings once
transaction costs are taken into account. Wahab and Lashgari (1993), Abhyankar
(1998), Brooks and Garrett (2002) analyse the UK market; Tse (1995) studies
the Japanese spot-futures lead/lag relation; Andreou and Pierides (2008) and
Kenourgios (2004) analyse the Greek market. Further, works such as Eun and
Shim (1989), Hamao et al. (1990), Antoniou et al. (2003), and Innocenti et al.
(2011) extend the lead/lag study to indices across dierent geographies. Each
of these works concludes that the temporal disequilibria that almost universally
exists in these studies admit no arbitrage opportunities.
2.3 - The Limits of Arbitrage
Section 2.2 presented examples from several market settings of prices diverging
from fundamental values, as well as examples of works which have documented
these phenomena. This section complements these empirical observations by37
documenting the various impediments that act to preclude arbitrageurs from
enforcing pricing eciency, the so-called \limits of arbitrage".
The concept of limited arbitrage is relatively new to the literature on pricing
eciency, but is a powerful reconciliatory tool between the resolute belief
in ecient prices on the one hand, and the view that irrational investment
creates exploitable mispricing opportunities on the other. Black (1986) and
De Long et al. (1990) were the rst to consider the implications on the
relationship between prices and fundamental values of arbitrageurs competing
against irrational investors - each inicting negative externalities on the other
through the eect of their trading behaviour on prices. Even in a simple setting
where the fundamental value of an asset is known a priori, disagreement between
arbitrageurs and irrational investors means that arbitrageurs are unable to bring
prices back to fundamental values.
With regards to the work presented in this thesis, the factors which act as limits
to arbitrage can be split into three broad categories: horizon risk, divergence risk,
and fundamental risk. This section presents a description of each of these types
of risk.
2.3.1 Horizon Risk
Horizon risk is the risk that a mispricing can take so long to correct itself,
that it is not worth exploiting from an arbitrageurs point of view. The risk
to the arbitrageur in this situation stems from considerations toward reporting
frequencies. Firms such as hedge funds must report their results to investors
at least annually, and if the arbitrageur has not yet realised the return from an
arbitrage position, investors might view this as indicative of poor skill. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) and Jurek and Yang (2007) point out that fund ows chase
performance. Jurek and Yang (2007) provide the rst analytical characterization38
of arbitrageurs behaviour when arbitrageurs are mindful of this fact. In their
work, the authors show that arbitrageurs restrict their investment activity in
mispriced assets which they to contain horizon risk.
Black (1986) is the rst work to assert that irrational investors (Friedman (1956))
contribute to arbitrageurs horizon risk. Simply stated, irrational investors can
keep the fundamental relationship between mispricing securities from restoring
itself to parity, due to their erroneous beliefs about the individual securities future
utility. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) suggest that delayed synchronization in
the actions of arbitrageurs exploiting the same mispricing opportunity may cause
this mispricing to persist.
Gatev et al. (2006) study the returns to arbitrage of exploiting temporary
mispricings across correlated pairs of stocks, while De Jong et al. (2009) perform
the same exercise for DLCs. In each of these studies, horizon risk is an important
impediment to arbitrage. In De Jong et al. (2009), some trading positions are
left open for 9 years before observing a price convergence sucient to cover the
cost of executing the trades.
2.3.2 Divergence Risk
Divergence risk, or \noise trader risk" is the risk that after an arbitrage position
is established, the actions of irrational investors can exacerbate the mispricing
between the securities which are the subject of the arbitrage trade. De Long et
al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) were the rst to emphasize that this
risk acts as an important impediment to arbitrage. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005) highlight the fact that besides irrational investors, predatory trading can
contribute to noise trader risk in nancial markets. To see this, consider a
situation in which an arbitrageur reveals their trading position. In this case,
predatory trading involves trading to deliberately drive the mispricing further,39
creating a capital loss for the arbitrageur. The arbitrageur is then forced to
liquidate the position at a highly unfavourable point in time (for the arbitrageur),
while benetting the predatory traders.
Edwards (1999) provides an excellent description of the fate of Long Term Capital
Management, a hedge fund which in 1998, which suered from predatory trading
as described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005). After suering signicant
losses in DLCs and xed-income arbitrage, John Meriweather, the Fund Manager,
revealed his trading positions in an open letter to their investors, hoping that
other arbitrageurs would see the nancial opportunities of these mispricings.
Lee et al. (1991) nd that noise trader risk, as explored in De Long et al. (1990)
accords with stylized facts about closed-end fund premia/discounts. Gatev et al.
(2006) nd that noise trader risk is a signicant source of volatility in arbitrage
returns across correlated pairs of stocks. However, the same is not true for the
study in De Jong et al. (2009), Hong and Susmel (2003), and Suarez (2005). Noise
trader risk in these settings is not prevalent, since the securities being traded are
fundamentally the same. In the case of ADRs, the two-way convertibility between
stocks and ADRs acts as a natural risk-management tool against divergence risk.
2.3.3 Fundamental Risk
Fundamental risk denotes the risk of a deterioration in the fundamental
relationship between two or more securities which are the subject of a statistical
arbitrage trade. For example, consider two nancial institutions X and Y that
operate the same markets and are domiciled in the same country. A price
deviation from historical norms between X and Y would induce arbitrageurs to
short the expensive stock while buying the cheap one. Suppose now that only one
of these institutions is found to be conducting fraudulent activities. This news
event would have the eect of breaking down the fundamental pricing relationship
which has up to then existed between X and Y.40
The prevalence of fundamental risk is well-documented in the literature. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), and Klibano et al. (1998) characterize this risk as unique
to noise trader risk, as the latter implies only a temporary divergence from
fundamental value.
While the way in which arbitrageurs trading behaviour is aected by aversion
to divergence and horizon risk is clearly documented, what remains unclear
is the precise nature of, and to what extent, aversion to fundamental risk
dissuades arbitrageurs from enforcing price parity. If arbitrageurs were to
exploit a mispricing opportunity based on some predictive model that spots a
deviation between two securities from common stochastic trends, then the existing
theoretical framework necessarily entails complete condence in the specication
of the model. In other words, the arbitrageur will, with probability 1, realize the
prot of the investment in the long term. Lamont and Thaler (2003a) characterize
the eect of fundamental risk by saying \An arbitrageur who shorts technology
companies and buys oil companies runs the risk that peace breaks out in the
Middle East, causing the price of oil to plummet". Note that in this case, it is
irrelevant to the arbitrageur's protability whether the original judgement that oil
appeared cheap was correct. The authors continue, \in contrast, if A and B have
identical cash ows but dierent prices, the arbitrageur eliminates fundamental
risk." To that end, the market studied in Gatev et al. (2006) carries inherent
fundamental risk, whereas the DLC and ADR markets studied in De Jong et al.
(2009) and Suarez (2005), respectively, do not.
The intuitive eect of fundamental risk would be to dissuade arbitrageurs
from investing fully in exploitable opportunities, a point that runs parallel to
considerations of leverage and margin constraints (Liu and Longsta (2004),
Kondor (2009)). In the absence of fundamental risk, or at least the aversion
to it, arbitrageurs are most aggressive when prices are furthest away from
fundamentals. This point relates to Friedman's (1953) famous assertion that41
\to say that arbitrage is destabilizing is equivalent to saying that arbitrageurs
lose money on average," which is implausible.
2.4 - Theoretical Models of Arbitrage
This section presents a summary of the theoretical models of arbitrage employed
in the extant literature. For each model, a mathematical formulation is presented,
as well as a discussion about how the model captures the various impediments to
arbitrage discussed in section 2.3.
2.4.1 The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process has widespread applications in academic
Finance other than the specic context of arbitrage. It has been applied to
mean-reverting returns in stock portfolios (Merton (1971), Wachter (2002)) and
interest rate modelling (Vasicek (1977)).
In Xiong (2001), Kargin (2003), Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya (2004) and
Jurek and Yang (2007), the authors make use of the OU process for modelling
a time-series of mean-reverting mispricings, akin to the spread between equity
pairs (Gatev et al. (2006)).
The OU process is simple in nature, and can be characterized as follows: Given
a nite horizon of time t 2 [0;T], a mispricing process Xt follows the process:
(1) dXt =  Xtdt + dWt;
where  is a parameter indicating the strength of mean-reversion,  indicates
the volatility, and dWt indicates innovations of a Geometric Brownian Motion
(GBM).42
The appeal of using this specication, as the authors show, is in that it
admits closed-form solutions to the arbitrageur's portfolio optimization problem.
Furthermore, because the dynamics in equation (1) do not pre-specify a period
at which the process Xt would necessarily return to zero, this model captures the
notion of horizon risk. Divergence risk is also captures because the magnitude
of Xt is unbounded. However, because the reversion term is linear in Xt,
this model does not capture the notion of fundamental risk. Specically, the
OU model exhibits a constant half-life in the mispricing, which in turn implies
that arbitrageurs who are faithful to this model have complete condence in an
eventual price convergence.
2.4.2 The Brownian Bridge Process
The Brownian Bridge (BB) process is utilized by Liu and Longsta (2004) to
model deviations from put-call option parity relationships. Using the same





Like OU, this model captures the notion of divergence risk; but nlike OU, this
model species a time in the future wherein the process Xt is guaranteed to return
to its mean. Therefore, the BB process does not capture horizon risk.
2.5 The Gaps in the Extant Literature
This section looks back on the rest of this chapter and outlines the gaps present
in the extant literature that this thesis aims to address.43
2.5.1 Gaps in the Theoretical Literature
The work of Xiong (2001, Kargin (2003), Liu and Longsta (2004), Boguslavsky
and Boguslavskaya (2004), and Jurek and Yang (2007) presents a gap in the
theoretical literature which this thesis aims to address. Specically, while the
models presented in these papers adequately capture the notions of divergence
risk and horizon risk, they do not capture the important notion of fundamental
risk. Fundamental risk is an important component of the propensity of arbitrage
to correct pricing disequilibria, and denotes the risk of deterioration in the
fundamental relationship between prices of stocks which are the subject of
an arbitrage trade. While there are many empirical works documenting the
prevalence of this risk as a deterrent to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Brennan and Schwartz (1990) among many others presented in this chapter),
this risk has not yet been quantitatively captured into an arbitrage trading
model. Doing so can potentially yield signicant insights into the important
relationship between arbitrage and price eciency, by examining the extent to
which arbitrageurs behaviour is aected by aversion to fundamental risk. Clearly,
the intuitive eect of this aversion would be for arbitrageurs to trade more
sceptically, but the exact mechanics of this are not fully understood.
2.5.2 Gaps in the Empirical Literature
In the works of Rosenthal (1983), Maldonado and Saunders (1983), Kato et
al. (1991), Wahab and Lashgari (1992), Park and Tavakkol (1994), Miller
and Morey (1996), Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Suarez (2005), and Gagnon
and Karloyi (2010), it is found that the pricing relationship in the market for
cross-listed securities (stocks versus their ADRs) exhibits deviations from parity.
This is particularly striking, given that stocks and ADRs are virtually the same
security. In theory, environments such as this should constitute fertile ground for44
arbitrageurs, who are compensated for appropriating these pricing disequilibria.
However, the same body of literature suggests that arbitrage is unprotable in this
market setting, primarily due to the costs associated with executing the arbitrage
trades. Furthermore, Werner and Kleidon (1996) and Chen et al. (2009) show
that investors in both the domestic and US markets are segmented, which implies
that investors in each of the two separate markets do not base their investment
decisions solely on the cheaper location to trade. This in turn implies that an
ecient pricing relationship between stocks and ADRs cannot be maintained
by investors in each of the two markets alone. The gap in the literature stems
from the fact that the extant literature has not considered that pairs trading
is an alternative mechanism by which arbitrage can enforce price parity in this
setting. Though the works of Hong and Susmel (2003) and Broumandi and
Reuber (2012) have applied a pairs trading strategy in the context of ADRs,
these works use daily data, which Suarez (2005) argues cannot yield signicant
insight into the prevalence of arbitrage in maintaining the stock-ADR pricing
relationship, since opportunities in this market are fast and eeting. A study
with realistic transaction costs and employing high-frequency intraday data has
not yet been undertaken.
While the seminal research of Zeckerhauser and Niederhoer (1983), along with
the works of Kawaller et al. (1987), Stoll and Whaley (1990), Wang and
Wang (2001) nd that futures prices can lead stock prices, the same works,
along with Brooks et al. (2001) nd that this relationship cannot be exploited
by arbitrageurs, primarily due to the costs associated with trading all of the
constituents that comprise the portfolio upon which the futures contract is based.
A parallel strand of research in Eun and Shin (1989), Abhyankar et al. (1997),
Antoniou et al. (2003), and Innocenti et al. (2011) document the existence
of lead/lag relationships across international markets. This is inspired by works
such as Ayuso and Bianco (2001) and Kearney and Lucey (2004) which document45
evidence of increasing global market correlations in recent years. A natural
question to ask is whether the increase in global market correlations give rise to
stable lead/lag patterns across market indices in dierent countries, and whether
these lead/lag patterns can be exploited by arbitrageurs. An investigation into
the protability of arbitrage using futures contracts has not yet been done.
Examining this concept with futures contracts circumvents the costs associated
with trading all the constituents of a stock index.Blank Page47
Chapter 3
Optimal Portfolio Selection in Nonlinear
Arbitrage Spreads
Abstract
This chapter analytically solves the portfolio optimization problem of an investor
faced with a risky arbitrage opportunity (e.g. relative mispricing in equity pairs).
Unlike the extant literature, which typically models mispricings through the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process, this work introduces a nonlinear generalization
of OU which jointly captures several important risk factors inherent in arbitrage
trading. While these factors are absent from the standard OU, it is shown
that considering them yields several new insights into the behaviour of rational
arbitrageurs: Firstly, arbitrageurs recognizing these risk factors exhibit a
diminishing propensity to exploit large mispricings. Secondly, optimal investment
behaviour in light of these risk factors precipitates the gradual unwinding of losing
trades far sooner than is entailed in existing approaches including OU. Finally, an
empirical application to daily FTSE100 pairs data shows that incorporating these
risks renders the presented model's risk-management capabilities superior to both
OU and a simple threshold strategy popular in the literature. These observations
are useful in understanding the role of arbitrageurs in enforcing price eciency.
Keywords: Pairs trading, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, Statistical
Arbitrage, Stochastic optimal control, Stability bounds.
JEL classication: G11, G12.48
3.1 - Introduction
In the pricing of related securities (for example shares with either identical or
similar characteristics), market eciency is enforced by the presence of rational
arbitrageurs (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Mitchell et al. (2002)). Friedman
(1953) argues that if the actions of noise traders cause such a price relation to
be violated, arbitrageurs seek to prot from this by betting on the elimination
of this violation. By demanding the cheap security and supplying the expensive
security, the actions of arbitrageurs exert forces on the mispricing to revert back
to its mean or natural level,1 which in turn generates a prot for the arbitrageurs
and enforces price eciency. However, unlike \textbook arbitrage" opportunities
(Bjork (2004)) which lock in a riskless prot and require no capital commitments,
these types of investments present risks to those who seek to engage in them.
To see this, note that if arbitrageurs position themselves to benet from the
convergence of a mispricing, it is possible for this mispricing to diverge further
before converging, or not converge at all, resulting in substantial losses for
arbitrageurs. In 1998, the near-collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management is frequently cited as an example of this phenomenon (Kondor
(2009), Edwards (1999), and MacKenzie (2003)).
Several works have sought to examine the role of arbitrageurs in markets by
modelling arbitrage opportunities and deriving corresponding portfolio strategies
in light of these inherent risks. Theoretical works favor the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck2
process (henceforth \OU") or the Brownian Bridge process as candidates to
1If a mispricing is between two identical shares quoted on dierent markets, then economic
arguments suggest a natural level of zero (Froot and Dabora (1999)). A mispricing between
any two cointegrated assets (Engle and Granger (1987)), can have its natural level take any
constant value.
2It is well-known that the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process has widespread applications in nance,
e.g. Wachter's (2002) and Merton's (1971) application to mean-reverting returns in stock
portfolios, applications to stochastic interest rates (Korn and Kraft (2002), Vasicek (1977)),
and applications to arbitrage opportunities in Xiong (2001), Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya
(2004), Jurek and Yang (2007), and Lv and Meister (2009).49
model the evolution of the mispricing (e.g. Jurek and Yang (2007), Xiong
(2001), and Liu and Longsta (2004)), while empirical works examine protability
in statistical arbitrage trading based on simple threshold trading rules (e.g.
Gatev et al. (2006)). A major commonality in the existing works lies in the
assumptions regarding the correction of mispricings: the larger the mispricings
are, the more dramatically they tend to be corrected. This assumption has clear
implications regarding the behaviour of arbitrageurs toward mispricings: the
greater the magnitude, the greater the investible opportunity. But this notion
seems inconsistent with economic arguments that mispricings can exhibit large
and long-lasting departures from fundamentals (e.g. Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), De Long et al. (1990)), or that the
fundamentals themselves can change (Lamont and Thaler (2003b)). While these
risk factors are largely ignored by existing models, considering them is essential
to fully examining the role of arbitrageurs in enforcing price eciency. To what
extent do these additional risk factors inuence the behaviour of arbitrageurs
towards mispricings? How do they aect what arbitrageurs interpret as attractive
investible opportunities?
This chapter develops a theoretical model to provide answers to these questions.
Its main contribution lies in the introduction of a novel stochastic process, whose
dynamics are aimed specically at capturing the fundamental risk factors ignored
by existing models of arbitrage. This process is a nonlinear generalization of
OU, and builds on Wong's (1964) physics-based repulsive Wong process. By
considering the problem under a partial equilibrium setting, this chapter is
able to fully characterize a representative arbitrageur's optimal portfolio policy.
The closed-form availability of the optimal portfolio policy considering these
additional risk factors allows us to make a number of interesting and novel
observations. Firstly, arbitrageurs recognizing the possibility of persistently
large mispricings exhibit a diminishing incremental propensity to exploit them,50
as they develop an aversion to fundamental risk factors and lose condence in
the model's ability to predict mean-reversion. Interestingly, this behaviour is
counter-intuitive from the point of view of OU, which ignores fundamental risk
factors and translates large mispricings into attractive opportunities and hence
portfolio allocations linearly. Secondly, since widening mispricings imply both an
improvement in the investment set and a capital loss on a current position, this
work explicitly shows that beyond certain bounds in the magnitude of mispricing,
a further widening of the mispricing prompts a reduction in the capital allocated
to exploiting it. This chapter refers to these bounds as stability bounds. This
artifact of the presented model complements the corresponding OU-specic result
in Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya (2004) and Jurek and Yang (2007). It is shown
that the stability bounds in the nonlinear model are always tighter than those
implied by OU. More importantly, this result suggests that when considering
fundamental risk factors ignored by OU and other existing models, arbitrageurs
seek to unwind losing trades sooner. Each of these observations is useful for
researchers examining the capacity and role of arbitrageurs in enforcing price
eciency.
By way of a pairs-trading exercise, this chapter examines the eect of
incorporating these fundamental risk factors on the nonlinear model's empirical
performance. This model is tested against OU and a \2-sigma" strategy common
in the literature (Gatev et al. (2006)), on daily FTSE100 pairs data obtained
from DataStream. The results are in favor of the nonlinear model, whereas
OU and the \2-sigma" strategy which frequently go bankrupt. These results
are interpreted as evidence that fundamental risk factors are signicant to the
capacity of arbitrageurs to enforce price eciency. Interestingly, since model
parameters are typically estimated from historical data, it is also found that the
nonlinear model is more robust to the adverse eects of parameter misspecication
than OU.51
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a review
of the related literature, further motivating approach taken in this chapter.
Section 3.3 derives the optimal portfolio strategy and stability bounds in the
model presented in this work, then compares these with the corresponding
results assuming OU. This section also presents a test to determine the eect of
parameter misspecication on the optimal portfolio strategy. Section 3.4 presents
a FTSE100 pairs-trading exercise. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 - Related Literature
There is considerable evidence that prices can diverge from fundamental values
and similarly, that relative prices can diverge from their natural levels. Shleifer
and Summers (1990) and Black (1986) highlight the eect of noise traders'
irrational trading behaviour on the formation of prices. Noise traders react
disproportionately to news in the belief that they have insider information
regarding the future direction of prices, creating a mispricing. On the one
hand, Friedman (1953) argues that such mispricings cannot exist for long,
as rational arbitrageurs will trade against noise traders, hence pushing prices
toward fundamental values. On the other hand, Lamont and Thaler (2003a)
nd examples of persistent deviations from the law of one price, Froot and
Dabora (1999) nd mispricings between Siamese twin shares, Malkiel (1977) nds
mispricings in the valuation of closed-end funds, and Lamont and Thaler (2003b)
nd mispricings in tech stock carve-outs. Consistent with the latter view, the
nonlinear model presented in this chapter is based on the notion that mispricings
can persist for signicant periods of time. But why in general does capital not
materialize to eliminate such mispricings?
The persistence of mispricings can be attributed to many factors. Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) show that when individual arbitrageurs attempt to52
\time the market", informational asymmetries can cause coordination problems
that consequently allow mispricings to persist. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005)
highlight the role of predatory trading behaviour in the persistence of mispricings.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Xiong (2001), and De Long et al. (1990) show that
impediments to arbitrage can arise endogenously. When arbitrageurs allocate
capital aimed at exploiting a mispricing, further divergences may cause them
to unwind positions at a loss to preserve capital, a phenomenon described by
Friedman (1953) as \buying high and selling low". This creates a price feedback
mechanism which exacerbates the mispricing. Lamont and Thaler (2003b), Liu
and Longsta (2004), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), and Basak and Croitoru (2000)
suggest that portfolio constraints can allow mispricings to persist. Moreover,
Kondor (2009) shows that arbitrageurs do not necessarily act to eliminate a
mispricing even when portfolio constraints do not bind, because \opportunities
might get better tomorrow".
The partial equilibrium model is aimed at capturing these intuitions into an
exogenously dened mispricing process. This is motivated in part by the
need for more robust quantitative risk management models in the wake of the
recent nancial crisis (see Shaw and Schoeld (2012)). The need for more
robust risk-management ties with arbitrageurs' prot-seeking behaviour. In the
empirical section of this chapter, it is shown that commonly-employed arbitrage
strategies which are not robust to fundamental risk frequently go bankrupt. After
specifying the model, this chapter develops an optimal portfolio policy for a
representative arbitrageur to adopt. This relates the model presented here to
Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya (2004), Jurek and Yang (2007), Liu and Longsta
(2004), and more generally to the portfolio optimization methodology pioneered
by Merton (1969, 1971).3
3Similar works exploring optimal portfolio selection in arbitrage include Mudchanatongsuk et
al. (2008), Kim et al. (2008), Lv and Meister (2009), and Elliott et al. (2005).53
Liu and Longsta (2004) model the arbitrage opportunity using a Brownian
Bridge process, which has two xed values a priori, typically at the start and
end of the investment horizon. Under this setup, arbitrageurs have perfect
ex-ante knowledge regarding the date of the elimination of a mispricing. Jurek
and Yang (2007) observe that, apart from nitely-lived opportunities such as
deviations from option put-call parity, arbitrageurs typically would not have
perfect knowledge regarding the elimination of a mispricing. They suggest
that general mispricings including relative mispricings between shares are better
modelled using OU, which implies uncertainty regarding the mispricing at all
future dates. Jurek and Yang (2007) also introduce the concept of horizon risk
and divergence risk which imply, respectively, uncertainty whether a mispricing
will converge prior to the reporting period, and a worsening in the mispricing
after an arbitrageur has opened a position. They argue that the Brownian
Bridge process considers only divergence risk, whereas OU considers both.
Nonetheless, a commonality between these approaches is that arbitrageurs have
perfect knowledge regarding the natural level of a mispricing. But this assumption
ignores Lamont and Thaler's (2003b) fundamental risk, which highlights changes
in economic fundamentals that can aect the natural mispricing level itself. The
presented model considers this risk. Even though the natural level is assumed
xed, the fact that an arbitrageur faithful to this model exhibits a diminishing
incremental exploitation of the mispricing can be interpreted in terms of his
decreased condence that the mispricing will revert to its natural level. On
the other hand, the fact that models based on OU or Brownian Bridge call for
aggressively increasing the capital allocation as divergences get large (linearly in
the case of OU) implies that arbitrageurs faithful to these models have complete
condence in the estimated natural level, which completely ignores fundamental
risk.54
The dynamics of the model presented in this chapter are simple enough to yield
a closed-form solution to the arbitrageur's allocation problem and to include OU
as a special case. Thus, these results can be readily compared to Jurek and Yang
(2007) or Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya (2004). The work here also relates to
Xiong (2001), Basak and Croitoru (2000), and Liu and Longsta (2004) in the
sense that log-utility over terminal wealth is assumed.
More generally, considering the arbitrageur's portfolio allocation problem in
partial equilibrium gives us two main advantages over the general equilibrium
models discussed in this section. Firstly, this is able to construct an
analytically tractable and empirically implementable optimal portfolio policy
for a representative arbitrageur, which yields novel insights into the behaviour
of rational arbitrageurs. This is particularly important in illustrating one
of the central novelties in the model presented in this chapter, namely the
scepticism toward exploiting large mispricings. Secondly, the precise conditions
are ascertained under which arbitrageurs cease exploiting a mispricing and unwind
losing positions, complementing works on the impediments to arbitrage.
3.3 - The Model
This section considers the behaviour of a rational arbitrageur who has access
to an arbitrage opportunity and a riskless asset. The riskless asset yields a
continuously compounded return. This work models the arbitrage opportunity as
a mean-reverting asset St. Intuitively, this asset can be thought of as a long/short
position in an equity pair. In this context, holding long one unit of St is equivalent
to holding one unit long in some undervalued security and one unit short in an
overvalued security at time t 2 [0;T].55
3.3.1 The Investment Opportunity:
Consistent with Merton (1969, 1971), Wachter (2002), and Kim and Omberg
(1996), it is assumed that the investible universe consists of two assets. The rst
is a risky asset St which describes the evolution of the arbitrage opportunity (i.e.
mispricing). The second is the risk-free asset Bt. The risky asset is shaped by the
hyperbolic tangent function, and this is precisely what this chapter relies upon
to model the notion of fundamental risk. This assertion is justied in the next
section and gure 3.1. The dynamics of these two assets, respectively, are given








dt + dZt; (1)
dBt = rBtdt: (2)
where S is the natural level of the mispricing, r is the risk-free rate, Zt is a
Brownian Motion with respect to the real-world probability measure, k > 0 is
the parameter of mean reversion, and  > 0 is the volatility parameter. The
investment horizon is continuous and nite from 0  t  T < 1. The parameter
c > 0 measures the nonlinearity in the mean-reversion component of (1). This
parameter is explored further below.
3.3.2 Contrasting the Nonlinear Dynamics with OU:
The parameter c > 0 is a novel feature in this model. This parameter species the
nonlinearity of mean-reversion in the stochastic process (1). To make clear the
connection between the model presented in this chapter and OU, it is observed












=  k(St   S)dt:
The right hand side of (3) is precisely the mean-reversion component of an OU
process with parameters k and . Indeed, this would reduce (1) to:
(4) dSt !  k(St   S)dt + dZt as c ! 0;
which implies that this model is now reduced to precisely the specication in
Jurek and Yang (2007). Further setting r = 0 and S = 0 reduces the model to
precisely the specication in Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya (2004).
As long as c remains strictly positive, the stochastic process in (1) is nonlinear
in the spread. Specically, the rate at which the strength of reversion increases
in St weakens, implying that the reversion term attains a limit as the mispricing
diverges signicantly from its natural level, i.e. jStj  S. To see this, let us force
















The right hand side of (5) implies that the strength of mean-reversion pulling
St to its natural level has attained its limit. This reduces the dynamics of the
mispricing (1) to:
(6) dSt !  
k
c
dt + dZt as S ! 1:
The dynamics now are a diusion process with a constant drift. But what is the
economic signicance of properties (3) and (5)?57
To adequately capture the realistic nature of a mispricing process, it is desirable
for a model to command dynamics simple enough to be practically implementable,
yet rich enough to capture realistic market characteristics. It has been shown that
the model presented in this chapter addresses an important phenomenon absent
from the dynamics of OU and the Brownian Bridge, namely fundamental risk.
Consistent with Shaw and Schoeld (2012), the \hyperbolic OU" process (1) is
approximately OU for a small mispricing (i.e. when St is close to S), but the
reversion term tails o as the mispricing becomes arbitrarily large, and tends to a
constant. This artifact captures the intuition that investors may have diminished
condence in that the mispricing will mean-revert. Conversely, OU necessarily
implies a mean-reversion that strengthens linearly with the mispricing.
3.3.3 Modelling Risk-Preferences:
A central part of establishing an optimal portfolio strategy is to obtain an idea
of the risk preferences of arbitrageurs. The representative arbitrageur is assumed
to maximize expected log utility over terminal wealth. Translating this to the
investment actions of a typical hedge fund, for example, terminal wealth can be
dened as the fund's performance at the end of a reporting period. Specically,
the arbitrageur seeks to maximize the value function:
(7) V (St;Wt;t) = maxNt [Et (lnWT)];
Here Nt is the number of units held in the mispricing St, and Wt denotes wealth at
time t. Equation (7) is an economic statement that, through optimally exploiting
the mispricing, an arbitrageur maximizes log utility over terminal wealth. In the
next section an explicit expression for Nt is derived.58
Log-utility occurs as a special case of the general CRRA family of power utility
(See e.g. Wachter (2002)). Here, log-utility is assumed for two main reasons.
Firstly, Breiman (1961), Kyle and Xiong (2001), and Lv and Meister (2009) show
that investors who assume log-utility will asymptotically outperform any other
strategy with certainty. Secondly, assuming log-utility admits a mathematically
tractable solution to the resulting stochastic optimization problem (see e.g. Kim
and Omberg (1996), Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya (2004), and Kargin (2003)).
This is particularly relevant to the optimization problem, given the nonlinearity
present in (1). Though assuming general CRRA would allow us to explore
inter-temporal hedging demands as in Kim and Omberg (1996) and Liu (2007),
it is noteworthy to point out that since OU occurs as a special case of the process
(1), and CRRA results for OU are available in Jurek and Yang (2007), conclusions
regarding inter-temporal hedging demands are likely to be maintained in a more
complex model such as the one presented in this chapter.
3.3.4 The Optimal Portfolio Strategy:
Here the optimal portfolio policy for the representative arbitrageur is derived.
First, the self-nancing condition is imposed. This requires that changes in wealth
are directly attributable to investment in the risky and risk-free asset, and no
external source. If Nt is the number of units held in the mispricing, and Mt is
the number of units held in the riskless asset, then the self-nancing condition
implies that the arbitrageur's budget constraint is given by:
(8) Wt = NtSt + MtBt; t 2 [0;T]:
Dierentiating the budget constraint with respect to time t yields:59
(9)





where the second equality in (9) imposes that whatever remains after investment
in the mispricing is invested in the riskless asset.4 To facilitate the analysis, a
new time variable  = T   t is dened as the time left for investing, so (7) is
re-written as:
(10) V (St;Wt;) = maxNt [Et (lnWT)]:
Maximizing (10) subject to (9) yields the optimal portfolio strategy. The optimal
number of units held in the mispricing depends on the current mispricing level,
current wealth, and time left for trading. Therefore, it is denoted by Nt(St;Wt;).
It is derived as follows:
Theorem 1. (OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO STRATEGY) The optimal portfolio
strategy for a log-utility maximizing arbitrageur facing investment opportunities












Proof. The proof is given in the Technical Appendix.

4Similarly, an arbitrageur willing to make an investment in the mispricing larger than current
wealth can do so by shorting the riskless asset.60
Remark 1. It is interesting to contrast the optimal portfolio strategy with
the equivalent OU strategy. Firstly, taking the limit c ! 0 in (11) yields the



















NOU is the specication in Jurek and Yang (2007). Setting r = 0 yields the
specication in Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya (2004).
While c is positive, the optimal holding is nonlinear in the mispricing, unlike
OU. This point is illustrated by comparing strategy (11), labeled NTANH, to the
equivalent OU strategy NOU using common parameter values. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 illustrates an interesting property: Unlike OU, this strategy implies
that, as the mispricing diverges away from its natural level, an arbitrageur
becomes less interested in further exploiting it. This idea represents an important
dierence between the model presented here and OU. The model presented in this
chapter interprets large divergences as potential regime breaks, consistent with
the notion of fundamental risk (Lamont and Thaler (2003b)). On the other hand,
OU interprets large divergences as attractive investment opportunities.
3.3.5 Do Arbitrageurs Always Exploit a Mispricing?
It seems intuitive to think that an arbitrageur will always exploit a mispricing
in pursuit of a prot. Indeed, Figure 3.1 illustrates this notion for a given level
of wealth. However, once an arbitrageur allocates capital aimed at exploiting a
mispricing, further divergence of the mispricing causes him to lose capital, and
hence his risk-bearing capacity. Since the optimal strategy calls for investment61
Figure 3.1 - Illustration of position size in the mispricing (spread).
The OU (red) and TANH (green) optimal portfolio strategies with parameters
for nonlinearity c = 0:3, mean-reversion k = 3, volatility  = 5, wealth W = 1,
risk-free rate r = 0, and natural mispricing level S = 0. The mispricing range is
S 2 [ 10;10], and the position in the mispricing taken by both strategies is on the
vertical axis.
immediately following a mispricing's departure from its natural level, it is shown
here that there is a critical level in the mispricing beyond which arbitrageurs
unwind positions at a loss to preserve capital. These are called stability bounds,
so-called because an arbitrageur only seeks to enforce price eciency (trade
against the mispricing) as long as the mispricing lies within these bounds.
Consequently, a scrutiny of the optimal portfolio policy (11) is done in order
to determine the direction in which an arbitrageur trades as a response to the
evolution of the mispricing process. It turns out that as long as the magnitude of
the mispricing relative to its natural level lies within the stability bounds, further
divergence causes the arbitrageur to continue investing against the direction of the
spread asset (i.e. exploiting the mispricing). However, once this stability bound is
breached, further divergence causes the arbitrageur to unwind a losing position,
eectively trading with the mispricing. The stability bounds are analytically62
characterized in the following theorem. Without loss of generality, the riskfree
rate is set at r = 0.
Theorem 2. (STABILITY BOUNDS) An arbitrageur will only trade against
a mispricing if the magnitude of the mispricing beyond its natural level,
 St   S
 ,
lies within a xed bound. Beyond this bound, an arbitrageur will unwind a losing
position. The bound is as follows:
(13)











Proof. The proof is given in the Technical Appendix.

Remark 2. Taking the limit c ! 0 shows that the stability bounds (13) tend

















Direct calculation in (14) shows that for any values of reversion k > 0, volatility
 > 0, and coecient of nonlinearity c > 0, the stability bounds in the model
presented here are tighter than those implied by OU. This implies that when
arbitrageurs are averse to fundamental risk factors, small losses are cut sooner
rather than potentially large losses later (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), De Long et
al. (1990)).
3.3.6 Robustness to Parameter Uncertainty:
It has been implicit up to this point that the investor has perfect ex-ante
knowledge regarding the values of the parameters k, c, and . This assumption is63
maintained in Brieman's (1961) and Lv and Meister's (2009) theorems regarding
non-bankruptcy of the trading strategy. In reality, parameters are often estimated
from historical data, and these theories seem predicated on the assumption that
the future perfectly mimics the past, and that the model used describes the time
series perfectly. Of course one cannot arm that the future will mimic the past
perfectly, nor that any diusion model can describe market evolution perfectly.
Thus the risk of bankruptcy persists in reality, which is in part due to model risk or
Knightian uncertainty (Knight (1921)). This realization leads us to an interesting
empirical question, namely what is the eect of a parameter misspecication on
the risk-management capabilities of the optimal strategy?
To answer this question, the optimal strategy (11) is compared against the OU
strategy on synthetically generated data by forcing trading in both models based
on deliberately wrong reversion and volatility parameters. The methodology is
as follows:
Here, 20,000 paths are simulated from both a discretized OU process and
the generalized Wong process (1) over one year with a time increment of 1
252
(corresponding to 252 trading days). The synthetic data is generated by a
Euler-Maruyama discretization scheme (see Kloeden and Platen (1999)). For
both processes, let us set c = 0:3, k = 4,  = 4, r = 0, and S = 0. The
initial value for each simulated path is set at zero, corresponding to no immediate
arbitrage opportunity. The optimal strategy (11) is then applied (now referred
to as NTANH), against the optimal strategy implied by OU, which is denoted by


















To test the eect of parameter misspecication in (15) and (16), this section
trades using deliberately wrong parameters k and . Specically, the parameters
k = k(1 + K) and  = (1 + Z) are set, with K 2 [0;3] and Z 2 [ 0:5;0]. This
means that the two strategies each trade with k ranging from its true value 4 up
to quadruple its true value 16, and  ranging from its true value 4 down to half
its true value 2. Let us dene a parameter grid such that it contains 16 values
for each parameter, implying 256 parameter combinations in total.
For each parameter combination and each strategy, two quantities are measured:
the proportion of trials which result in bankruptcy, and the mean terminal wealth
over all trials. The results for OU-generated data are presented in Figure 3.2,
and the results for Wong-generated data are presented in Figure 3.3.
The top-left panel in Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of trials of the OU strategy
that result in bankruptcy. Trading using the correct parameters universally causes
none of the trials to result in bankruptcy. However, note that overestimating the
reversion parameter leads to an increase in the proportion of trials that result
in bankruptcy. Underestimating the volatility parameter has the same eect.
This is intuitive, as the portfolio strategy seeks to exploit a mispricing which it
believes will revert faster than it actually would, or exhibit less volatility than it
actually would, respectively. The ndings here are consistent with Lv and Meister
(2009) in the sense that quadrupling the estimated reversion parameter has the
identical detrimental eect to halving the volatility estimate. For NOU in the
top-left panel, 58% of trials ended in bankruptcy as a result of trading wrongly
assuming half the actual volatility or quadruple the actual reversion rate. The
corresponding statistic for NTANH in the center-left panel is 41%. This shows
that, given a common set of model parameters, the optimal TANH strategy (15)
is more robust to parameter misspecication than the corresponding OU strategy
(16) in terms of bankruptcy risk. This point is illustrated in the bottom-left
panel, which subtracts the proportion of trials resulting in bankruptcy of the65
Figure 3.2 - Eect of parameter misspecication on the optimal strategy
assuming OU mispricing dynamics. Simulation of 20,000 OU paths over 252
trading days with parameters k = 4,  = 4, r = 0, c = 0:3, and S = 0. Both
OU and TANH optimal strategies (11) and (12) trade assuming deliberately wrong
parameter values. K 2 [0;3] implies reversion k 2 [4;16], while Z 2 [ 0:5;0]
implies volatility  2 [4;2]. Initial wealth is set to 1. The left panels show the
eect of parameter misspecication on the probability of bankruptcy, while the
right panels show this eect on mean terminal wealth.
TANH strategy from that of the OU strategy for each combination of k and .
That the bottom-left panel is positive reects the notion that the TANH strategy
is less susceptible to parameter misspecication.66
The top-right and center-right panels of Figure 3.2 show the eect of parameter
misspecication on terminal wealth in both strategies. These panels show that
OU results in higher mean terminal wealth. The reason for this is that the
diminishing marginal exploitation of the spread in the NTANH strategy for
a common set of parameters implies that the TANH strategy always invests
relatively less in the spread than NOU for a given wealth. Therefore, should the
larger position assumed by NOU not result in bankruptcy, mean terminal wealth
would be greater, reecting the greater risk OU takes. This fact is illustrated
in the bottom-right panel, which subtracts the average terminal wealth of the
TANH strategy from the OU strategy for each combination of k and . That
the bottom-right panel is largely positive implies that, conditional on survival,
the OU strategy outperforms the TANH strategy in terms of maximizing terminal
wealth. However, the OU strategy goes bankrupt quicker than the TANH strategy
on average, which explains the \dip" below zero in the bottom right panel.
Next, the results of running the same exercise as above are presented but on
synthetic data generated from the generalized Wong process (1). These are shown
in Figure 3.3.
The layout of Figure 3.3 is identical to that of Figure 3.2. As one might expect,
overestimating the actual reversion and underestimating the actual volatility
each have detrimental eects on trading performance. When assuming Wong
mispricing dynamics, the OU strategy NOU goes bankrupt 59% of the time when
either the reversion parameter is misspecied to be quadruple its actual value,
or the volatility parameter half its actual value. The corresponding bankruptcy
rate for NTANH is 46%. These statistics are almost identical to those obtained
assuming OU mispricing dynamics.
Although very similar, comparing Figures 3.2 and 3.3 reveals an interesting
nding. In analyzing the eect of parameter misspecication on terminal wealth,
there is one qualitative dierence between assuming OU mispricing dynamics67
Figure 3.3 Eect of parameter misspecication on the optimal strategy
assuming Wong mispricing dynamics. Simulation of 20,000 paths generated
from (1) over 252 trading days with parameters k = 4,  = 4, r = 0, c = 0:3,
and S = 0. Both OU and TANH optimal strategies (11) and (12) trade assuming
deliberately wrong parameter values. K 2 [0;3] implies reversion k 2 [4;16], while
Z 2 [ 0:5;0] implies volatility  2 [4;2]. Initial wealth is set to 1. The left panels
show the eect of parameter misspecication on the probability of bankruptcy,
while the right panels show this eect on mean terminal wealth.
and Wong mispricing dynamics. The bottom-right panel of Figure 3.3 shows by
how much NOU outperforms NTANH. It seems surprising at rst that this number
should be positive, especially when the trading parameters are highly misspecied.68
Indeed by Theorem 1, NTANH is demonstrably the optimal trading strategy suited
towards the generalized Wong process (1). How then can NOU outperform NTANH
when trading with wrong parameters? Consider the following facts for a xed set
of parameters: First, NOU is naturally more aggressive than NTANH. Second, the
generalized Wong process (1) is naturally less mean-reverting than the OU process
(see section 3.3.2). Taken together, the NOU returns massive prots in a very
small number of \lucky" cases, even though it goes bankrupt in the vast majority
of others. The handful of high-return cases have a disproportionately large eect
on mean terminal wealth. Nevertheless, because NOU goes bankrupt quicker than
NTANH, the latter outperforms in both terminal wealth and bankruptcy aversion
when the error in parameter estimation becomes suciently large.
Overall in the simulation, bankrupted trials were not excluded from the
calculation of average terminal wealth. Excluding bankrupted trials results in
a large positive bias in terminal wealth. This is intuitive, as the surviving trials
would have taken extremely large positions in the mispricing, which \luckily"
paid o, and exaggerate average terminal wealth.
3.4 - Empirical Application
Now that this chapter has characterized the optimal portfolio strategy (14) and
explored its properties, let us implement these results to historical data. This
is done by testing the empirical ecacy of the NTANH strategy (15) against two
alternative strategies. The rst is the NOU optimal strategy (16). The second is
a popular \rule of thumb" strategy based on Gatev et al. (2006). For consistency
this chapter calls this strategy NGGR, and it works as follows:
NGGR: Open a position in the mispricing when the mispricing deviates
more than 2 standard deviations away from its historical mean. Hold the
position constant until the mispricing reverts fully to its natural level.69
The size of the position opened and held is the equal to what NOU would
suggest (i.e. the position of an equivalent OU arbitrageur).
Remark 3. The nature of NGGR is such that a position is not opened in a
mispricing immediately as a mispricing diverges from its natural level. Because
of this, some tests result in NGGR not trading at all. Also, because there is no
intrinsic stop-loss strategy to the 2-sigma approach (Gatev et al. (2006), De Jong
et al. (2009)), the analysis presented here does not impose one.
3.4.1 Data, Historical Period, and Methodology:
The data is obtained from DataStream, and chosen for four pairs of FTSE100
companies using closing daily prices over the period Jan 1, 2001 - Jun 30, 2008
(the training period), and Jul 1, 2008 - Jun 30, 2009 (the trading period). When
these days are non-trading (holidays, new years), the previous day's closing value
is chosen as a proxy.
The four pairs are chosen based on the highest correlation of daily returns over
the training period. Beyond the statistical relationship, they are commercially
intuitive choices, and are as follows:
 HSBC and Barclays Plc.
 Legal & General and Prudential.
 Royal Dutch Shell-B and BP.
 Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Plc.
To construct the mispricing St, the linear dierence in daily closing prices for
each pair is taken. Denoting these prices by Pi;t for i = f1;2g implies:
St = P1;t   P2;t:70
Here, an OU process is calibrated for its reversion, volatility, and natural level
parameters f^ k; ^ ; ^ Sg respectively, over the training period Jan 1, 2001 - Jun 30,
2008 (1956 trading days) using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Once estimates
for f^ k; ^ ; ^ Sg are obtained, they are substituted into both NOU and NTANH
5 and set
the coecient of nonlinearity c = 0:02 into NTANH. For NGGR, the historical mean
is set equal to the natural level implied by the OU calibration, i.e. ^ GGR = ^ S,
and calculate the historical standard deviation ^ GGR based on the 1956 daily data
points over the training period.
With this in hand, let us proceed by backtesting the three strategies (15), (16),
and NGGR over the trading period Jul 1, 2008 - Jun 30, 2009, a total of 261
trading days. Initial wealth is set arbitrarily at 1.
3.4.2 Application to FTSE100 data:
The results of the empirical backtest are shown in Figures 3.4 through 3.7.
Throughout the backtest, the parameter r = 0 is set to clearly illustrate the
dierences between the three strategies without the complication of an additional
asset. Further, this section assumes no transaction costs, full use of the short
proceeds, and no other institutional frictions. The performance of each strategy in
this analysis is measured by the total prot at the end of the trading period, which
can easily be seen in gures 3.4 - 3.7. Furthermore, the quality of mean-reversion
is assessed qualitatively based on the number of zero-crossings of the mispricing
process. This can also be easily seen from the gures.
[Figures 3.4-3.7 presented in the Technical Appendix of this chapter]
5Implementing NTANH as a stand-alone model requires its parameters to be estimated
independently through numerical methods (Hurn et al. (2003), Picchini (2007)). The
application here makes use of the parameter c as a proxy to Knightian uncertainty, and hence
use a common set of parameters for NTANH and NOU. Consequently, an interpretation of this
methodology is a replacement of the risk aversion parameter inherent in general CRRA utility,
in favor of a parameter of model-risk aversion: The higher the value of c set by the arbitrageur,
the less condence he has in the ability of OU to capture the dynamics of the mispricing.71
The results show that, when mean reversion is poor, or there are apparent signs
of a regime-break, both the NOU and NGGR strategies lead to very large losses, or
bankruptcy. Conversely, assuming a coecient of curvature c = 0:02, the NTANH
strategy never resulted in bankruptcy, despite poor mean reversion and regime
breaks in the data. Figure 3.7 shows that although NOU returns are volatile, they
are very high when reversion is strong about the natural level S. Given that the
nature of OU is such that an arbitrageur has complete condence in reversion to
the natural level, this result is expected.
The backtesting period is chosen specically to test the models' ability to handle
the tumultuous market conditions characteristic of that period. Nevertheless,
the four examples in Figures 3.4 through 3.7 represent a wide range of market
characteristics regarding the evolution of the spread. Overall the results are
consistent with the intuition from the works mentioned in sections 3.1 and 3.2 in
this chapter.
3.5 - Conclusion
A partial equilibrium, nonlinear model of arbitrage is developed; aimed
specically at capturing the fundamental market- and sentiment-based risks
inherent in arbitrage trading. In so doing, it is demonstrated that the
incorporation of these risks yields novel insights into the optimal behaviour of
rational arbitrageurs. Most importantly, this work derives an optimal portfolio
strategy in closed form, and hence the simplicity of this framework provides
potential for its use in further investigating the role of arbitrageurs in enforcing
price eciency.
The approach taken here draws insight directly from the empirical and
behavioural perspectives regarding the conduct of rational arbitrageurs facing
irrational noise traders. As a result, the specication presented in this chapter72
captures far broader market risk factors related to arbitrage than otherwise
assuming OU or a Brownian Bridge. Moreover, a proxy to the notion of Knightian
uncertainty is provided. It is shown that the incorporation of these factors
results in a portfolio strategy exhibiting a diminishing appetite for exploiting
widening mispricings: a feature absent in existing specications. Consistent
with empirical observations, the model presented here incorporates fundamental
risks which manifest as regime-breaks or persistent mispricings, whereas OU and
the Brownian Bridge do not. When tested empirically, the model presented in
this chapter delivers superior overall performance compared to OU or \2-sigma"
strategies. This result is attributed to the notion that this model better captures
realistic market phenomena.
Though the role of arbitrageurs is typically aimed at exploiting mispricings,
widening mispricings clearly have adverse eects on arbitrageurs' wealth. The
model presented in this chapter shows that under certain conditions, arbitrageurs
will choose to unwind losing positions by eectively trading with (not against)
the mispricing in order to preserve capital, even when investible mispricing
opportunities are at their greatest. The closed-form availability of these
conditions complements the existing literature on arbitrage in both partial and
general equilibrium. Specically, the presented model calls for small losses to be
cut sooner, in contrast to OU which calls for large losses to be cut later, or indeed
the \2-sigma" strategy which has no intrinsic risk-management functionality
whatsoever. In the empirical application, these artifacts of OU and the \2-sigma"
strategies frequently lead them to bankruptcy, unlike the model presented here,
which remains solvent. Based on this, one can conjecture that the specication
presented here results in lower price ineciency and volatility following the
liquidation of funds.
The empirical period over which the model presented in this chapter is tested
contains a 4-month period during which short-selling was banned in nancial73
stocks in the UK (September 19, 2008 to January 16, 2009). Nevertheless, the
bulk of the empirical period studied in this chapter had short-selling permitted.
It could be argued that while incorporating the short-selling ban would obviously
impact the numerical result of arbitrage prots, the theoretical and qualitative
insights derived in this chapter would remain unaected.
Although the four pairs studied in this chapter were chosen to represent a wide
range of market behaviour, it could be argued that these were chosen \after the
fact". However, the choice nevertheless clearly illustrates how the performance of
the model presented in this chapter contrasts with those of the extant literature
- and that is the thrust of this chapter's contributions.
Future research in this area would benet from incorporating frictions such
as transaction costs and portfolio constraints into the presented model, which
would allow an investigation into market eciency based on the kind of
portfolio algorithm which is the subject of this chapter. The results from such
a study would complement existing studies, which are predominantly based
on threshold-type trading strategies. Further, the framework developed here
could be generalized to consider the eects of arbitrage activity on market
liquidity, price-feedback, and contagion. Since the model shows that recognizing
fundamental risk factors inherent in arbitrage trading reformulates arbitrageurs'
behaviour toward the exploitation of perceived mispricings as compared to
existing models, the results of such a generalized study can yield new insight
into the eects of arbitrage activity on price stability in the wider market.74
3.6 - Technical Appendix
In this section, Theorems 1 and 2 are presented, along with accompanying proofs,
as well as Figures 3.4 through 3.7.
Theorem 1. (OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO STRATEGY) The optimal portfolio
strategy for a log-utility maximizing arbitrageur facing investment opportunities












Proof. First, let us substitute (1) and (2) into budget constraint (9) to obtain:
(18)













+ r(Wt   NtSt)

dt + NtdZt;
Now let us employ stochastic optimal control. First, the value function (10)









































































Next, let us employ Bellman's principle of optimality Et(dV ) = 0 to derive

















































along with the terminal condition:
(20) V (S;W;0) = 0:
Condition (20) implies that at the end of the investment horizon  = 0, any
arbitrage opportunity is worthless to the arbitrageur, since the trading period is
over. Deriving (19) has used the fact that Zt is a martingale under the real-world
measure. Equation (19) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (henceforth \HJB")
equation for the optimization problem. In order to derive the optimal policy,
let us maximize the right hand side of (19) with respect to N. To achieve this,
let us use the rst-order optimality condition with respect to N by dierentiating

























and nally solving for N while using subscripts to denote partial derivatives:



















Equation (21) gives us the optimal portfolio policy N. However, in its current
form, it is of little use, since it depends explicitly on partial derivatives of the value
function V (S;W;). Without eliminating the dependence of the optimal portfolio
N on the derivatives of the value function, equation (21) remains of little practical
use. In order to proceed in nding an explicit form for N, this step employs the
method of separation of variables. Let us postulate a trial solution, in terms of
a functional form for V (S;W;), then verify whether it solves the HJB equation
(19). It is asserted that it is likely V (S;W;) inherits some structural properties
from its components, namely the log-utility function (Bjork (2004)). To this end,
let us postulate the following solution:
(22) V
(S;W;) = ln(W) + f(S;):
Here f is a function of S and  only. Condition (20) translates to f(S;0) = 0.
















A sucient condition for optimality of the portfolio policy is the concavity of the
value function with respect to the state variable W. From above, one can see
that the sign of VWW and the fact that wealth is non-negative ensure that this
ansatz, if successful in the sense below, would yield the optimal portfolio strategy.













and substituting (23) together with the relevant partial derivatives into the HJB

















































This step has successfully eliminated W from (24), meaning the HJB equation
is reduced in dimensionality, and now only depends on S and . Moreover,
the optimal portfolio policy in (23) is fully characterized and stripped of its
dependence on the value function or any of its derivatives. Since this theorem
is only interested in the optimal portfolio strategy, the optimization procedure
is complete. One needs only to make the technical assumption that a smooth
function f(S;) twice dierentiable in S, once in , exists and satises (24).6
6The explicit solution f(S;) would allow us to characterize an optimal portfolio policy for a
general CRRA arbitrageur. See e.g. Jurek and Yang (2007) and Boguslavsky and Boguslavskaya
(2004).78
This assumption is used in Xiong (2001). This completes the proof of Theorem
1.

Theorem 2. (STABILITY BOUNDS) An arbitrageur will only trade against
a mispricing if the magnitude of the mispricing beyond its natural level,
 St   S
 ,
lies within a xed bound. The bound is as follows:
(25)
































Next, substituting from (1), (9), and (11), along with the partial derivatives of
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Equation (27) separates the instantaneous changes in the optimal portfolio
allocation as a response to changes in the mispricing dS and the time variable
dt. Therefore, the direction of the arbitrageur's portfolio allocation in response
to changes in the mispricing is governed by the sign of the rst set of square

















Simplifying this expression, the following result is obtained:
(28)












Figure 3.4 - HSBC - Barclays: Poor mean reversion. The top panel shows
the evolution of the daily spread during Jul 1, 2008 - Jun 30, 2009 (Brown) and the
natural spread level (Black). The middle panel shows the corresponding evolution
of wealth resulting from trading using NTANH (Pink), NOU (Blue), and NGGR
(Red). The bottom panel shows the percentage of wealth invested in the spread.81
Figure 3.5 - RBS - Lloyds: Regime break. The top panel shows the evolution
of the daily spread during Jul 1, 2008 - Jun 30, 2009 (Brown) and the natural
spread level (Black). The middle panel shows the corresponding evolution of wealth
resulting from trading using NTANH (Pink), NOU (Blue), and NGGR (Red). The
bottom panel shows the percentage of wealth invested in the spread.82
Figure 3.6 - Legal&General - Prudential: Poor mean reversion. The
top panel shows the evolution of the daily spread during Jul 1, 2008 - Jun 30,
2009 (Brown) and the natural spread level (Black). The middle panel shows the
corresponding evolution of wealth resulting from trading using NTANH (Pink),
NOU (Blue), and NGGR (Red). The bottom panel shows the percentage of wealth
invested in the spread.83
Figure 3.7 - Royal Dutch Shell B - BP: Good mean reversion. The
top panel shows the evolution of the daily spread during Jul 1, 2008 - Jun 30,
2009 (Brown) and the natural spread level (Black). The middle panel shows the
corresponding evolution of wealth resulting from trading using NTANH (Pink),
NOU (Blue), and NGGR (Red). The bottom panel shows the percentage of wealth
invested in the spread.84
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Chapter 4
Arbitrage and the Law of One Price in the
Market for American Depository Receipts
Abstract
This is the rst work to highlight pairs trading as the main price-correcting
mechanism by which arbitrage can maintain stock-ADR parity in the
high-frequency intraday domain. It is shown that arbitraging stock-ADR pairs
extracts small per-trade prots which accumulate to a substantial aggregate
return. The observed strong tendency of pricing disequilibria to mean-revert,
along with the two-way convertibility between stocks and ADRs, mean that
arbitrageurs face minimal risks toward price divergence. They do, however,
face uncertainty about the duration of individual trades. The magnitude of
this uncertainty relates directly to the prot target arbitrageurs set after a
long/short position is established. This fact can explain why some disequilibria
go unexploited. Overall, the work presented here provides evidence against
automatically ecient prices (the notion that price disequilibria are eliminated
in absence of arbitrageurs), and supports the view that mispricings incentivise
arbitrageurs to enforce market eciency.
Keywords: American Depository Receipts, Arbitrage, Law of One Price, Pairs
Trading.
JEL classication: F36, G14, G15.86
4.1 - Introduction
The principal aim of this chapter is to highlight, in a high-frequency setting, a
previously overlooked market mechanism by which stock-ADR parity is enforced,
namely, pairs trading. This is contrasted with an alternative parity enforcement
mechanism which is the one typically assumed in the ADR literature, and which
is known as \direct arbitrage". The latter entails actually converting the stock
into the ADR or vice-versa.
This chapter is motivated by an observation made by Chen et al. (2009) and
also by Werner and Kleidon (1996), that markets for cross-listed securities are
less than fully integrated. That fact suggests that investment decisions in each
of the two markets are not based solely on which is the cheaper location to
trade. Hence, aggregate \local" trading is not enough to enforce stock-ADR
parity. It is therefore intuitive that these markets should constitute fertile ground
for arbitrageurs, who are compensated for correcting price disparities across
international markets (e.g. Kondor (2009)). Several works explore whether these
disparities are protable from an arbitrageur's point of view. On the one hand,
Kato et al. (1991) and Miller and Morey (1996) nd that arbitrage is unprotable
due to costs and regulatory impediments. On the other hand, Suarez (2005)
nds evidence of protable arbitrage in French stock-ADR pairs. However, all
of these studies use the direct arbitrage method as the means of arbitrage that
they study. In other words, they assume that the only way to realise a prot
from a stock-ADR mispricing is to convert the stock into the ADR, or vice versa.
However, as is explain in detail later, the costs of conversion are very high. For
this reason, it is found that in the UK sample, direct arbitrage is not a protable
arbitrage strategy. With this in mind, what other market mechanisms can restore
stock-ADR parity? What are the characteristics, costs, and impediments facing87
these mechanisms? What inferences can be drawn about the auto-eciency of
the stock-ADR market?
Using 131 million quote price observations, this chapter sets out to provide
answers to these questions. The quote price data covers an exhaustive sample
of 25 rms domiciled in the UK, which also trade as ADRs on US exchanges.
This work contributes to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, this chapter
introduce to the ADR literature an overlooked market mechanism by which the
Law of One Price is enforced, namely pairs trading1 - a trading technique explored
in the literature by Gatev et al. (2006), Jurek and Yang (2007), and De Jong
et al. (2009). Pairs trading is an arbitrage strategy based on establishing a
long/short position in a pair of relatively mispriced securities, then liquidating
the position upon price convergence. Compared to direct arbitrage, pairs trading
enjoys fewer cross-border regulatory constraints and lower trading costs. These
features allow the pairs trader to exploit pricing anomalies which, comparatively,
would be prohibitively expensive or even infeasible for the direct arbitrageur.2
Clearly, pairs trading relies on the establishment of a long-short position in the
stock and ADR. While this strategy is susceptible to short-selling bans, there are
no short-selling bans in eect during the historical period studied here.
The second contribution of this chapter involves an examination of the limits
to stock-ADR arbitrage. Why do seemingly protable disequilibria appear and
persist in such a highly developed and liquid market? What are the most
prevalent risks facing arbitrageurs in this market? If an exploitable opportunity
1This technique in the context of ADRs bears supercial similarity to Gagnon and Karolyi's
(2010) \perfect foresight arbitrage". Its major dierence is in the fact that the methodology
presented here has no ex-ante knowledge of price convergence. Hence one is able to fully
characterize trading risks. The technique is also similar to that employed in Hong and Susmel
(2003) and Broumandi and Reuber (2012), except that this chapter employs high-frequency
intraday data.
2A typical regulatory constraint limits conversion of the home stock into ADRs. Puthenpurackal
(2006) describes how the Infosys ADR traded at over double the price of its home-market stock.
Unlike pairs trading, direct arbitraging cannot extract prots in this environment.88
is either missed or ignored in such fertile ground for arbitrageurs, then it is
important to understand why.
The results show denitively that small but frequent protable disparities appear
in stock-ADR price pairs. When a simple threshold pairs trading strategy is
applied, some 640 arbitrage trades yield in total 1.45% in excess of the risk-free
rate. Arbitrage returns are uncorrelated with broad market returns. Furthermore,
since stocks and ADRs are two-way convertible, stock-ADR pairs trading entails
no fundamental risk. In contrast, a direct arbitrage strategy applied to the sample
yields only a single protable trading opportunity. Hence from the point of view of
a direct arbitrageur, this market gives the illusion of being auto-ecient, without
any need for arbitrage as a parity enforcement mechanism.
The results also show that the main disincentive facing arbitrageurs in this
market is an uncertainty towards the duration of open arbitrage positions.
Half of all arbitrage positions last under nine minutes. However, for each
additional US-cent demanded by arbitrageurs in per-share prot, the expected
trade duration more than doubles, and the standard deviation of trade durations
increases by some 20%. Arbitrageurs who are averse to this uncertainty, and
widen their trade entry bounds, observe lower duration uncertainty but also fewer
exploitable opportunities. These results are consistent with works documenting
arbitrageur heterogeneity, synchronization problems between arbitrageurs, and
the foregoing of present opportunities in the hopes of \even better ones tomorrow"
(Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) and Kondor (2009)). Finally, this work
examine the mean-reverting characteristics of stock-ADR mispricings by way
of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck calibration exercise. Across the sample, stock-ADR
mispricing evolutions exhibit remarkably strong mean-reversion, with half-lives
lasting no more than a few minutes. Hence, the risk posed by a worsening of the
mispricing after a long/short position is established, is minimal.89
Overall, this work provide evidence against the auto-eciency of prices in markets
for cross-listed securities, and suggest that arbitrage is an important mechanism in
maintaining stock-ADR parity. It is concluded that pricing anomalies incentivise
arbitrageurs to restore price parity, consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz (1976,
1980).
In the rest of this chapter, section 4.2 reviews the literature, section 4.3 describes
the dataset and methodology, section 4.4 presents the main empirical results and
robustness tests, and section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 - Related Literature
Introduced by JP Morgan in 1927 as a way for US investors to diversify
their holdings internationally, ADRs are a dollar-denominated representation
of ownership in a non-US company. They trade as conventional shares on
US exchanges, and provide identical cashows as their corresponding domestic
stocks. In this regard, the two are arguably the same security (see Pulatkonak
and Soanos (1999)). Moreover, since ADRs are two-way convertible into their
domestic stocks, the Law of One Price suggests that the two securities should
trade at parity. However, several works document factors such as foreign capital
controls, trading costs, high T-bill rates which reduce the incentive to arbitrage,
and heterogeneity in investor preferences, as factors keeping the stock-ADR
relation signicantly away from parity (Grossmann et al. (2007), Gagnon and
Karolyi (2010) and Rabinovitch et al. (2003)).
Since the seminal work on ADRs of Rosenthal (1983) and Maldonado and
Saunders (1983), research surrounding ADRs can broadly be split into two
categories: The rst involves investigations into the contribution of cross-listings
to international price discovery, and the determinants of premia and discounts
of ADRs relative to their home-market (underlying) shares. Eun and Sabherwal90
(2003) examine US stocks which also trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange, and
nd that price adjustments to disequilibria occur on both markets. They suggest
that the speed of the adjustment process relates positively to competition for
order ow, and that prices in the thinner market adjust quicker. Grammig et al.
(2005) examine 3 German stock-ADR pairs and conclude that the majority of
price discovery occurs in the home market, while price adjustment following an
exchange rate shock occurs on the ADR side. Grossmann et al. (2007) examine
74 stocks from nine countries against their ADRs, and show that transaction
costs and high T-bill rates act to augment stock-ADR mispricings. Rabinovitch
et al. (2003) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) suggest that the prevalence of
ADR premia/discounts relate negatively to the degree of economic home-market
development: The less economically developed the home-market, the greater
the magnitude of ADR premia/discounts relative to the home-market stock.
Furthermore, foreign-ownership restrictions act to augment ADR mispricings and
a frequently-cited case study of India's Infosys is discussed in Puthenpurackal
(2006). Overall, this strand of research highlights factors which can keep the
stock-ADR relation away from price parity.
The second strand of research recognizes explicitly the role of arbitrage in
enforcing the Law of One Price. This group examines to what extent mispricings
between ADRs and their home-market shares constitute arbitrage opportunities.
It is this group to which this chapter contributes. Are ADR premia/discounts
exploitable; or attributable to costs and other regulatory and institutional
frictions?
Frequently using daily closing prices, early research aimed at answering this
question largely concludes in favour of price eciency, and nds little if any
exploitable price discrepancies between ADRs and their underlying shares.
Examples of such works include Kato et al. (1991), Wahab and Lashgari
(1992), and Park and Tavakkol (1994). However, as Suarez (2005) points91
out, if stock-ADR markets are indeed price-ecient, then one would expect
exploitable mispricings to be short-lived and hence invisible to the daily observer.
Furthermore, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) point out that since international
markets trade at dierent hours, conclusions based on closing prices are unlikely
to be denitive due to an inevitable relative price change between the close of
each market.
To address the problems surrounding daily sampling, recent works have used
higher-frequency datasets to examine whether arbitrage opportunities exist in
the stock-ADR market. Suarez (2005) uses quote-level data for 12 French stocks
and their ADRs. He concludes that arbitrage opportunities can exist but that
trading costs massively impede protability, and the prots that typically remain
are comparable to the opportunity costs of hiring a nancial expert to monitor
the market. Miller and Morey (1996) use a 3-month high-frequency dataset of a
single British stock and its ADR, namely Glaxo-Wellcome, and conclude rmly
that no arbitrage opportunities exist. Hence the conclusions of high-frequency
works are unclear, and the question remains: Are there arbitrage opportunities
in ADR markets?
This chapter sets out to denitively answer this question. Inspired by Chen
et al. (2009) and Werner and Kleidon's (1996) conclusion of heterogeneity
between UK and US investor preferences, it is puzzling that the majority of
works conclude that very few arbitrage opportunities exist. Indeed, if the two
markets were fully integrated, then competition for order ow alone should be
enough to enforce price eciency, as investors would be indierent toward holding
stocks or ADRs, and base their decisions solely on the cheaper trading venue.
Conversely, in segmented markets, arbitrage opportunities should be visible and
protable enough to attract capital and enforce price eciency. The notion that
arbitrage is unprotable and yet stock-ADR markets are segmented is precisely92
what motivates us to pursue alternative mechanisms by which the Law of One
Price can be enforced.
This work employs a pairs trading approach, which by nature is contrarian,
since it relies on exploiting a price divergence which the arbitrageur hopes will
converge. This ties this work directly to the substantial body of literature
examining short-run mean-reversion in securities prices. Inspired by Jegadesh
and Titman's (1993) observation that previous \loser" stocks tend to outperform
previous \winner" stocks, contrarian strategies such as pairs trading have become
a very prevalent tool in enforcing price eciency in many contexts. Gatev et al.
(2006) employ this methodology in the context of statistically cointegrated pairs
of stocks, and De Jong et al. (2009) employ the same methodology in the context
of dual-listed shares such as Royal Dutch Shell or Unilever. As Ponti (1996,
2006) points out, this methodology is not without risk. Pairs trading involves
going long one underpriced security while simultaneously shorting the expensive
security in the hope that both prices \converge". If they diverge further, the
pairs trader suers a capital loss. The appeal of applying this methodology to
ADRs is in the fact that ADRs are arguably more economically similar to their
underliers than a pair of dual-listed stocks, which cannot be \converted" into one
another.
4.3 - Data and Methodology
This section presents a description of the dataset and data renements, together
with details of the pairs trading strategy employed.
4.3.1 UK Stock and ADR Data
Contemporaneous intraday quotes from Bloomberg are obtained for a
comprehensive list of 25 UK ADR-stock pairs in existence through the period93
April 4, 2011 through August 5, 2011. To make the price comparison between
UK stocks and ADRs, the contemporaneous GBP/USD exchange rates are also
obtained from Bloomberg. obtained. Details of the stock-ADR pairs can be found
in Table 1. In total there are 130.7 million quotes.
Table 4.1. List of UK ADRs. The sample over the period April 4 through August
5, 2011. For each company, the ADR ratio shows how many UK shares trade as a single
ADR. The 5th and 6th columns show the total number of quotes for each rm. The 7th
and 8th columns express the average per-second liquidity (in dollars).
Table 1 describes the list of companies used in this sample. These are highly
liquid large capitalization companies. The average per-second liquidity provided
to the market is in excess of $15,000. Liquidity in this context refers to the volume
of orders submitted to the market.
Each daily trading window was chosen to match the period where the London
and New York markets were both open. Through the sample period, this window94
length is equal to two hours, specically 9.30am to 11.30am New York time
which corresponds to 2.30pm to 4.30pm London time. Estimates of broker
commissions are obtained from research published by Investment Technology
Group,3 a Canada-based trade cost analysis rm, while estimates of exchange
commissions are obtained from the London Stock Exchange and New York Stock
Exchange websites.
To arrive at a nal list of companies, a list of all UK stocks is compiled, which
trade as ordinary shares and have ADRs which trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or
AMEX. This process achieves two crucial renements: Firstly, it lters out ADRs
which are only issued over-the-counter at the depository bank, and are hence
not suitable for pairs trading because they are not exchange-traded. Secondly,
to ensure maximum liquidity, this work considers only ordinary shares and not
preferred shares. Overall this process ensures a deliberately conservative approach
in terms of the likelihood of nding exploitable mispricings.
This section applies a number of quote-ltering algorithms to lter out erroneous
quotes. The process is aimed at ensuring that the reported quotes are executable
in sucient quantities to make the arbitrage operation economically viable. First,
inspired by Schultz and Shive (2010) and Marshall et al. (2010), this section lters
quotes where the ask price exceeds the bid price by 25% or more, in addition to
bids being higher than asks. This section also lters bid-bid or ask-ask returns
exceeding 25%.
The second ltering process is aimed at eliminating execution risk (see Kozhan
and Tham (2012)). Quotes arrive irregularly and often quickly. An arbitrageur
issuing a market order against a quote is not guaranteed to be executed at the
quoted price, if another order was submitted a short time before. Execution risk is
particularly important as one would expect the stock-ADR market to be heavily
monitored, and heavily arbitraged. To address this risk, the quotes are processed
3Available at www.itg.com/news events/papers95
into one-second bins based on their volume-weighted average price (VWAP). To
illustrate this, consider the following four quotes arriving in the 9:30:00 am to
9:30:01 am interval:
 Ask 100 shares at $85.30.
 Bid 180 shares at $85.20.
 Ask 150 shares at $85.35.
 Bid 120 shares at $85.25.
This one-second time interval carries a VWAP bid price of $85.22 with a depth
of 300 shares, and a VWAP ask price of $85.33 with a depth of 250 shares. There
are two advantages in this process. First this eliminates execution risk. Second,
it provides the arbitrageur with the full depth of the limit order book, rebuilt
every second. Overall, this process is conservative towards nding exploitable
mispricings, since the arbitrageur is never trading at the best available prices
unless all quotes arriving in any given 1-second window are equal.
4.3.2 Constructing the Mispricing Process
To arrive at a tradable mispricing or \spread" in the stock-ADR pair, the UK
stock price is multiplied by the ADR Ratio for each company as shown in Table
1, and then translated to the US dollar. This gives us two dollar-denominated
time-series: One ADR time-series, and one UK stock time-series translated by the
contemporaneous spot exchange rate. With this in hand, this section extracts for
each company the UK stock absolute premium/discount compared to the ADR,
and express the result in dollars.
Let us denote the UK stock bid and ask prices as Sbid and Sask respectively.
Furthermore, the ADR bid and ask prices are denoted as Abid and Aask
respectively. Finally the spot GBP/USD exchange rate (amount of dollars per96
Figure 4.1: The Mispricing Process. This gure shows the stock-ADR mispricing
process for Royal Dutch Shell A for each contemporaneous 1-second interval through the
period April 4 - August 5, 2011. The vertical axis denotes the magnitude of mispricing in
dollars. This chart plots the dierence between the stock bid price and the ADR ask price.
British pound) bid and ask prices are denoted as FXbid and FXask respectively.
Let us now dene the mispricing schedule M as:
(1) M =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
Sbid  FXask   Aask if Aask < Sbid  FXask
Abid   Sask  FXbid if Abid > Sask  FXbid
0; otherwise.
The example of the Royal Dutch Shell A mispricing schedule is given in Figure 4.1.
The horizontal axis of the gure denotes 604,800 second-by-second observations
spanning the entirety of the data period (April 4 - August 5, 2011). The vertical
axis indicates the premium/discount of the stock relative to the ADR in dollars.
Positive territory suggests the stock is overpriced relative to the ADR.97
The rst case in equation (1) is a situation where the UK stock is trading at a
premium relative to its ADR. To initiate a position in the mispricing, the UK
stock is sold short at the bid price, and the ADR is bought long at the ADR
ask price. The second case in equation (1) is a situation where the UK stock is
trading at a discount relative to its ADR. In this case, the opposite arrangement
is executed to initiate a position in the mispricing. The case where M = 0 is
a situation where there is overlap between the currency-adjusted bid/ask spread
of the UK stock and its ADR. In this case, though the mispricing may not be
strictly zero, it is nevertheless unprotable. In other words, stock-ADR pairs are
price-ecient whenever M = 0. Once a position is established in the mispricing,
how an arbitrageur closes that position to realize a prot is precisely what
dierentiates pairs trading from direct-arbitraging. The pairs trader maintains
the individual long-short positions until the mispricing converges, whereas the
direct-arbitrageur converts the cheaper security into the dearer security, and sells
it immediately onto the corresponding market.
It is important to note that in the context of equation (1), the bid and ask
prices account for the entire structure of transaction costs, including exchange
and brokers' fees, the bid-ask spread, market impact costs, taxes, etc. Therefore
the notion of \bid" and \ask" in equation (1) are best interpreted qualitatively.
4.3.3 Direct Arbitrage vs Pairs-Trading: Costs and Risks
This section illustrates the main dierences between the direct-arbitrage strategy
employed elsewhere in the literature, and the pairs trading technique which
forms the subject of this chapter. In view of equation (1), it is informative to
estimate the total prots attainable from following a strategy of direct-arbitrage,
i.e. treating the stock and ADR as interchangeable securities. The quantity M
can be used to estimate total arbitrage prots. To see this, consider a trading
horizon 0 = t1  t2  :::  tn = T split into n intervals (e.g. n-minute intervals).98
If Mti is the mispricing process observed at time ti, then one can estimate total
prots by the simple sum,




Protable direct arbitrage occurred just once in the entire sample, specically for
Aviva Plc on April 15, 2011 at 14:30:01 GMT. This result is in contrast to Suarez's
(2005) data sampled roughly a decade before ours. However, this disappearance
of such \riskless" pricing anomalies can be attributed in part to the advent of
algorithmic trading and the automatic dissemination of quotes in recent years.4
In contrast, pairs trading relies on the converge of a mispricing once a long-short
position has been established. Though these results suggest that convergence
typically takes place in a matter of minutes, pairs trading nevertheless faces an
altogether dierent set of risk factors relative to the direct-arbitrage approach
(see Ponti (1996)). If a mispricing widens after a position is established, the
pairs trader stands to make a capital loss on her position. If a margin call is
issued, the pairs trader must liquidate part of her long-short portfolio at a highly
unfavorable point in time. As for direct-arbitrage, the ADR conversion facility
can be temporarily halted with very little notice. If an arbitrageur is in the
process of conversion to take advantage of a price discrepancy, this can leave her
with excess inventory: an unwanted open position in one or both securities. This
point has received relatively little attention in the literature, including papers
which directly perform this type of arbitrage operation such as Suarez (2005).
Another fundamental dierence between pairs trading and direct-arbitraging
involves the costs associated with the operation. Pairs trading involves four
transactions in total: two to take a position in the mispricing, and two to
4See e.g. Chordia et al. (2011), Chaboud et al. (2009), and Hendershott et al. (2011).99
unwind the position once price parity is restored. This incurs costs of two full
bid-ask spreads, plus associated commissions. Furthermore, since The Finance
Act (1986), the UK imposes a Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (SDRT) of 0.5% on
the purchase of UK stocks.5 The selling of UK stocks does not incur SDRT.
Direct-arbitrage, on the other hand, involves one purchase of the cheaper security
and one sale of the expensive security, a total of two half-spreads incurred in
cost. The cheaper security needs to be converted to the more expensive security
to complete the operation. Custodian banks (major ones include Bank of New
York Mellon and JP Morgan) operating ADR schemes charge a fee of $0.05 per
conversion. Further, if a UK stock is converted into an ADR, the applicable
rate of UK SDRT is levied at 1.50%. This is to allow for the fact that future
trades in the newly-created ADR will not incur UK SDRT. With this in mind,
an interesting question arises: Which arbitrage method is cheaper to implement?
The cheaper method to arbitrage depends on the full structure of transaction
costs faced by the arbitrageur. Intuitively, consider that only the largest and
most liquid UK companies can aord maintaining ADR programs. Shares
in these companies are likely to exhibit the smallest bid-ask spreads, which
compensates for the fact that pairs trading involves four transactions, whereas
direct-arbitrage involves two. By obtaining precise estimates of the full spectrum
of transaction costs in each case, this work suggests that pairs trading is cheaper
to implement. Hence exploitable mispricings are more visible to the pairs trader.
The demonstration of this point is the central aim of the following analysis.
4.3.4 Transaction Costs
It is informative to assess the costs associated directly with trading. Table 4.2
shows for each company and each ADR in the sample, the median, 5th and 95th
percentiles of all computed bid-ask spreads.
5Based on the Oxera (an economics consultancy) report \Stamp Duty: its Impact, and the
Benets of its Abolition" - May 2007. Available at (www.oxera.com).100
Table 4.2 Bid-ask spreads. The median, 5th and 95th percentiles of bid-ask spreads
for each stock-ADR pair.
What is interesting in table 4.2 is that the median bid-ask spreads seem
signicantly lower than those assumed elsewhere in the literature (De Jong et
al. (2009) for example, calculate a median of 25 basis points (bp)). At rst
this seems surprising, but this observation can be explained as follows: Firstly,
Easley and O'Hara (1987) show that bid-ask spreads are inversely related to
trade size. With this in mind, it is reasonable that the calculated median bid-ask
spreads here are signicantly lower than those assumed elsewhere in the literature,
especially since the sample consists of shares in the top two quartiles of the FTSE
100 index. Within the sample, the correlation between UK bid-ask spreads and101
average per-minute quoted volume is -16%, and the corresponding gure for ADRs
is -40%. Secondly, Hendershott and Menkveld (2011) provides evidence that the
advent of algorithmic trading, now accounting for some 70% of US equity trades,
has improved liquidity particularly in large stocks. One eect of this development
is the narrowing of spreads.
Further to the bid-ask spread, other direct trading costs are presented which
aect retail investors, namely brokerage commissions, exchange trading fees, and
UK taxes. Table 4.3 presents a summary of these costs (in bp).
Table 4.3 Institutional frictions. Direct transaction costs associated with trading in
both UK stocks and ADRs.
The exchange trading fees are obtained from published reports on both the LSE
and NYSE websites. Both exchanges frequently revise their cost structures, often
switching from at per-trade fees to variable tiered fees. At no point during
the sample period do the costs exceed 1bp, hence one can assume this gure
conservatively.
An inspection of Tables 2 and 3 reveals that pairs trading is by far the cheaper
method of arbitraging than the direct-arbitrage approach. Median spreads are
rarely over 10bp, and spreads would have to exceed 100bp for the direct-arbitrage
approach to be more cost-ecient. The next section explores a further cost
advantage of pairs trading, namely the ability to circumvent UK SDRT, a feature
which remains impossible for the direct-arbitrageur.102
4.3.5 Dierent Investors = Dierent Costs
Contracts-for-dierence (CFDs), are SDRT tax-free derivative instruments which
give an investor exposure (long or short) to price movements of an underlying
security, e.g. a stock. Avoidance of UK SDRT may be attributed to the surge in
CFD trading on UK stocks. CFD transactions have increased from accounting
for 10% of UK equity transactions in 2001, to 35% in 2007. The largest group
of users of CFD contracts are nancial institutions and hedge funds, followed by
retail investors.6
The exercise presented here proles large institutional investors trading CFDs.
This type of investor benets from the lowest overall transaction costs, since
CFD positions are exempt from UK SDRT. A CFD investor may be retail or
institutional, and one would reasonably expect institutional CFD traders to
benet from far lower costs than retail CFD traders.
The view espoused in this chapter is that CFD traders at large investment
banks or hedge funds are most able to exploit stock-ADR mispricings, because
they circumvent UK SDRT and face the smallest broker commissions. The
representative arbitrageur in this study is a CFD trader.
4.3.6 The Pairs-Trading Strategy
The pairs trading strategy employed requires an arbitrageur to specify two
parameters, namely the entry bound and the exit bound. The entry bound
denotes the level of mispricing above or below parity at which a pairs trade is
initiated, while the exit bound signals the termination of the arbitrage position,
when the mispricing in the stock-ADR pair reaches parity.
6Financial Services Authority, Disclosure of Contracts of Dierence: Consultation and Draft
Handbook Text (November 2007), pp. 11-12.103
Dierent works specify dierent methods toward selecting these bounds. For
example, Gatev et al. (2006) follow a statistical approach where two-standard
deviations from a historical mean (the latter interpreted to be the point of price
parity) is an entry level. A mispricing level returning to its historical mean is then
deemed to be at parity, triggering the unwinding of the pairs trade. On the other
hand, De Jong et al. (2009) follow an approach based on economic fundamentals.
They specify a range of entry/exit bounds, the exit bound based on the theoretical
point of price parity (see Friedman (1953)) - typically a mispricing level of zero.
Consistent with the latter, the entry/exit bounds are based on fundamentals. This
has the advantage that the entire data period can be considered out-of-sample.
Unlike the statistical approach, the approach based on fundamentals does not
require a historical \training" period as a point of reference from which to generate
trading signals. Akin to De Jong et al., this work considers a wide range of
entry/exit bounds in order to assess the sensitivity of arbitrage returns to the
prot target set by arbitrageurs.
This work imposes the conservative constraint of assuming that the investor has
no access to short-sale proceeds. Further, it is assumed that the investor must
be able to cover the short position at all times in cash, a requirement similar to
D'Avolio (2002). Hence a short position immobilizes its value in the investor's
cash, in the same way a long position does. As a simple example, consider two
stocks both trading at $50. If an investor has a $100 capital base, the largest
long/short portfolio that can be formed is 1 stock short and 1 stock long. This
requirement is clearly stricter than the US Regulation T 50% margin requirement
as described by De Jong et al. (2009). In reality, this situation may occur
if, for example, the investor utilizes dierent brokers for the stock and ADR
positions. In this case, she may not be able to use the stock in which she is long,
as consideration for collateral in the short position.104
To formalize the pairs trading strategy algebraically, let us start by dening
terms: In the trading horizon 0  t  T, the UK bid and ask stock prices are
translated (subscripts removed for neatness) St into dollars by multiplication with
the corresponding bid or ask GBP/USD spot rate FXt as per equation (1). If
the ADR price at time t is denoted by At, one can construct a time-series of the
absolute stock-to-ADR mispricing, called Rt, as follows:
(3) Rt = St  FXt   At:
Equation (3) is what is used to produce a mispricing process such as that in
Figure 4.1. The parameter Ft denotes the level at which the UK stock trades at
parity with the ADR. It is proposed that the true price parity in the stock-ADR
pair occurs not at Rt = 0, but instead when the stock trades at a 25bp discount
relative to the ADR. The reasoning behind this is as follows: If one assumes
that investors in the UK and US exhibit homogeneous preferences, so that they
care only about the cheaper location to trade, and indierent towards owning a
stock or an ADR, it follows that in order to tempt them to buy UK stocks over
ADRs, the UK stock will have to trade at 50bp or more below its ADR price.
This overcomes the incidence of the SDRT. All Rt for the data are adjusted to
incorporate this fact.
If Ct refers to the total costs of completing a round-trip pairs trade, it remains
only to dene the entry/exit bounds for the pairs trade. This section posits
that the arbitrageur enters a pairs trade at a variable arbitrary magnitude a (in
dollars) away from parity, and exits when she overcomes trading costs, plus a
variable prot margin (in dollars). Let us denote this prot margin by E.
Finally, if Wt is the arbitrageur's wealth at time t in US dollars, then one can
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0:5Wt
StFXt if Rt < a
  0:5Wt
StFXt if Rt > a
0; otherwise.
Similarly, the arbitrageur's open position in the ADR, NADR
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 0:5Wt
At if Rt < a
0:5Wt
At if Rt > a
0; otherwise.
Taken together, equations (4) and (5) suggest that if a mispricing is wide enough
to at least compensate the costs of completing a pairs trade, the arbitrageur
will allocate half her capital to going long the cheap security, half to short
the expensive security. Thus she has a dollar-neutral portfolio. Once the
arbitrageur has established a long-short position, she unwinds this position when
the magnitude of the mispricing falls below a level which compensates for the
costs associated with the trade, plus a prot margin E (in dollars). Otherwise,
the position remains open. Formally, at each subsequent time-step (t;t + 1], the







0 if kRt+1   Ft+1k  Ct+1 + E
NStock
t otherwise,







0 if kRt+1   Ft+1k  Ct+1 + E
NADR
t otherwise.
Intuitively speaking, equations (4)-(7) describe a simple threshold pairs trading
strategy. If the magnitude of the mispricing exceeds a pre-set level, the
arbitrageur shorts the expensive security and buys the cheap security. This
position is held open until the mispricing narrows just enough to compensate
for trading costs plus a small pre-set prot margin per unit of long/short security
traded. The next section presents the empirical results of the pairs trading
exercise.
4.4 - Results
This section presents the results and analysis of the returns to the pairs trading
strategy. An arbitrageur is chosen to represent the proprietary trading desks
at large nancial institutions with direct access to the CFD market. One would
reasonably expect trading costs to be a major impediment to arbitrage in markets
with near-perfect substitutes (see section 4.3). Further, this choice is supported
by Werner and Kleidon's (1996) suggestion that stock-ADR arbitrage is most
heavily undertaken by large institutional investors.
First, this section presents the returns to arbitrage across each of the 25
stock-ADR pairs. Then, the entry/exit arbitrage bounds are varied. This process
helps assess the sensitivity of arbitrage returns to the prot target set by the
arbitrageur. It also helps understand the risks inherent in pairs trading, with
regards to holding costs. Third, this section analyzes the risk characteristics of
arbitrage returns, by way of calculating trade half-lives. Finally, this section107
discusses the wider risks inherent in stock-ADR arbitrage trading, and explain
why mispricings persist in such a developed market.
4.4.1 Individual Returns (The $0.12/$0.01 case)
The arbitrageur sets her entry level at a point whereby the magnitude of absolute
mispricing exceeds $0.12. The position is then unwound when the mispricing falls
below a level which covers the bid-ask spread and exchange fees (see Table 4.3)
plus a $0.01 prot margin per long/short unit.
Table 4.4 shows the results of the trading exercise (Equations 3-7) for each
individual stock-ADR pair. Overall, 646 long-short positions across all pairs were
initiated and completed. The median daily prot is 0.59bp, and the median time
a position remains open is 507 seconds. These gures suggest that stock-ADR
arbitrage are characterized by the incidence of small and quickly-disappearing
windows of opportunity.
Around 5% of arbitrage positions were held for 87 seconds or less, illustrating
the fact that arbitrage opportunities in markets for close substitutes disappear
quickly. On the other hand, one trade (Lloyds Plc) was held for the entirety of
the trading window. This may be in part due to the simplistic nature of the
threshold strategy employed, or characteristic of the risks inherent in this type
of arbitrage (see section 4.4.4).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the cumulative daily wealth at the portfolio level (i.e.
averaging across the 25 stock-ADR pairs). Interestingly, cumulative wealth
exhibits low volatility and rarely decreases at the daily level. This fact illustrates
the mitigation of idiosyncratic risks from individual stock-ADR pairs across the
exhaustive sample.108
Table 4.4 Trading results. Trading results for the $0.12/$0.01 case. The rst column
shows the number of positions initiated whereby the stock traded at a discount. Similarly
the second column illustrates ADR discount. The next three columns show return statistics
for each stock-ADR pair. The last 3 columns show the median, 5th, and 95th percentiles
of seconds each trade was kept open.
A natural question to ask is whether the incidence of exploitable mispricings can
be predicted. Are there certain times each day where mispricings are more likely
to occur? To answer this question, let us split the daily trading window into
1-minute intervals, totalling 120 minutes per day. A plot is presented of how
many times within each 1-minute interval an arbitrage position is initiated. The
results are presented in Figure 4.3.
Besides a mild concentration of exploitable mispricings occuring in the rst and
last minutes of each trading day, there does not seem to be an apparent pattern
as to when mispricings occur.
The next section examines the sensitivity of arbitrage returns to the prot target
and entry thresholds.109
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Portfolio Wealth. This gure shows the cumulative daily
wealth at the overall portfolio level, assuming an initial wealth W0 = $100 on the vertical
axis. The horizontal axis denotes the number of trading days.
4.4.2 Robustness to Varying the Entry/Exit Levels
Levels at which arbitrage positions are initiated and unwound are set arbitrarily.
How sensitive is the trading performance to the values at which these bounds are
set?
This section presents an analysis to assess the degree to which trading
performance is aected by these set levels. In doing so, the trading exercise
is repeated but considers 9 combinations of entry/exit bounds. The entry are set
to where the mispricing exceeds $0.12, $0.15, and $0.18 away from parity. For
each of these levels, it is imposed that the arbitrageur demands $0.01, $0.02, and
$0.03 as a prot margin per long/short unit, once all costs have been recovered.
Table 4.5 presents the trading results.110
Figure 4.3: Incidence of Mispricings. Total number of arbitrage positions initiated
across each 1-minute contemporaneous interval of the trading day. The horizontal axis
shows the GMT interval during which both US and UK exchanges trade.
What is immediately striking to us in Table 4.5 is the large number of arbitrage
positions generated. Excess returns are economically small but statistically
signicant. One can posit that this type of arbitrage may be lend itself well to the
utilization of leverage to magnify returns. However, it can also seen from Table
4.5 that the expected trade duration is highly variable, and increases directly
with the prot target set by the arbitrageur. The implications of this uncertainty
toward the persistence of mispricings and the general price-correction mechanism
is discussed in detail in section 4.4.4. Further, Figure 4.3 above suggests that the
incidence of protable disequilibria is scattered randomly throughout the trading
day. Having to keep capital readily available to exploit quickly-disappearing
opportunities may act as a deterrent to arbitrageurs (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).111
Table 4.5: Returns for Dierent Investors. This table documents the eect of varying
the entry/exit bounds on the returns to stock-ADR arbitrage. The rst column shows the
annual return in excess of the risk-free rate. The second column shows the percentage of
negative returns. The third and fourth columns show the median and standard deviation
of trade duration (in seconds). The nal column shows the total number of long/short
positions established and closed.
Overall, Table 4.5 shows that larger disequilibria disappear more quickly, which is
consistent with the notion that in the absence of fundamental risk factors, larger
pricing anomalies are inherently less risky to exploit (De Jong et al. (2009))
and act as greater incentives for arbitrage capital (Grossman and Stiglitz (1976,
1980)).
4.4.3 The Dynamics of Mean-Reversion
At this point, it has been shown that pairs trading is an alternative mechanism
to direct arbitrage, by which stock-ADR pricing misalignments can be protably
exploited. However, in contrast to direct arbitrage, pairs trading invariably
involves keeping a long/short position open for a period of time. This clearly
involves the risk that the stock-ADR prices may take a very long time to converge,
or may even not converge at all. This section explores the dynamics of price
convergence between stock-ADR pairs.
Parity in this chapter's stock-ADR relationship can be expressed in the form of
a real exchange rate, FXtSt
At = 1, where the price levels are the prices of the stock112
and ADR respectively. This is useful because there is an established literature on
mean-reversion dynamics for real exchange rates, e.g. Osbat et al. (2003), Cheung
et al. (2004), Nam (2011), Astorga (2012). These papers use cointegration and an
error correction model (ECM) to derive the half-life of Purchasing Power Parity.
This method is adopted to compute the half-life of stock-ADR price parity.
The specic variant of ECM that is used for the analysis presented here is from
Brooks (2008). An Engle-Granger cointegration (Engle and Granger (1987))
model is employed across all 25 stock-ADR pairs. Let us begin with the following
transformations:
st = log(FXt  St)
at = log(At)
Now, an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to establish that all st and
at are highly signicantly integrated of order  I(1). One can then estimate the
cointegrating regression using OLS:
(8) st = at + ut:
The estimates for alpha ^  are displayed in the rst column of Table 4.6. As one
would expect, all are very close to unity.
The residuals, ^ ut, are highly signicantly integrated of order  I(0) across all
25 stock-ADR cointegrating relationships. Thus let us proceed to estimate an
Error-Correction Model (ECM) as follows:
(9) st = 1^ ut 1 + 2at + vt;113
where ^ ut 1 = st 1   ^ at 1 is the error correction term. The coecients in (9)
are estimated using OLS. In particular, this section is interested in the speed
of mean-reversion, 1, whose values and corresponding t-statistics across all 25
stock-ADR pairs are provided in the second and third columns, respectively, of
Table 4.6. The magnitude of all t-statistics is very large, indicating that all
stock-ADR pairs exhibit strong mean-reverting behaviour.
The fourth column of Table 4.6 documents the R2 for each of the 25 ECM
regressions, with average values of around 80%. The nal column of Table 4.6
reveals the half-life (speed of reversion), 1, of these mispricings which are derived





The half-life numbers show that an average stock-ADR mispricing reduces its
size by half in under 7 minutes. This result is consistent with earlier results
regarding the expected duration of trades (e.g. Tables 4 and 5). Overall, high
mean-reversion rates, coupled with short half-lives, suggest that the risk faced by
pairs traders of a widening mispricing is negligible.
4.4.4 On the Limits of Arbitrage
This section considers why exploitable price disparities arise in the rst place,
and why they persist in such a highly developed market with no capital controls
and no restrictions on cross-border arbitrage. In the context of stock-ADR pairs
trading, this issue essentially boils down to two main questions: Firstly, are the
trading strategies presented in this chapter implementable in practice? Secondly,
are there risks which act as disincentives to arbitrage?114
Table 4.6: Dynamics of mean-reversion. For all stock-ADR pairs, the rst column
shows the cointegrating vector  from equation (8). The second and third columns show,
respectively, the speed of mean-reversion 1 from equation (9), and the corresponding
t-statistic. The fourth column shows the R2 value for model (9), and the nal column
shows the half-life of deviations from parity.
Regarding the rst question, Kozhan and Tham (2012) point out the signicance
of execution risk. Market orders are not guaranteed to be executed at the quoted
price, if a quote is either removed or has already been lled. The question then
is, what happens if an order gets lled at the next best price? The data sample
relies on volume-weighted average price quotes rebuilt every second of the trading
overlap (see section 4.3.1). As a result, the orders submitted in the context of
this analysis are never executed at the best available price. This conservative
approach mitigates execution risk in the analysis. Furthermore, CFD contracts
(used in this study) are widely-traded instruments which circumvent UK SDRT.115
Some 30% of UK equity trades are done through CFDs, and the primary user of
CFDs are large nancial institutions and hedge funds (see section 4.3.5).
Liquidity is a source of risk for which arbitrageurs need compensation. The
sample includes 25 of the most liquid UK companies, with liquidity on both
the stock and ADR side averaging around $12,000 per second. Furthermore,
the process of volume-weighting quotes also factors in market impact costs. An
arbitrageur can execute the entire depth of the order book each second at the
prices presented in the analysis. This work conjectures that relaxing this process
would magnify returns, but leave arbitrageurs open to liquidity risk and excess
inventory. Overall, it is posited that the mispricings presented in this chapter are
implementable in practice.
Now, this section turns its attention to the risks associated with arbitrage trading.
As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and De Long et al. (1990) point out, pairs trading is
inherently susceptible to noise trader risk. Unlike the direct arbitrage approach
employed by Suarez (2005), pairs trading involves keeping open a long/short
position for some time. The mispricing may worsen signicantly, resulting in
a capital loss to the investor, and possibly a portfolio liquidation at a highly
unfavorable point in time. However, stock-ADR pairs trading has a unique way
of mitigating this risk entirely. How? If an arbitrageur initiates a long/short
position in a mispricing, and the mispricing worsens, the arbitrageur can exit
this position by converting the security held long into the security held short to
close out the position. The loss in that case is limited to the costs associated
with the conversion process (see table 4.3). Note that this feature is unique to
stock-ADR pairs trading, and is not possible in pairs trading cointegrated stocks
(Gatev et al. (2006)) or even dual-listed companies (De Jong et al. (2009)).
Ponti (1996, 2006) argues that there are signicant holding costs associated with
convergence trading. Of these, the most prevalent in the context of the work
presented here is the uncertainty toward price convergence. Looking at Table116
4.5 reveals some interesting insights: When arbitrageurs increase their prot
target per long/short unit even slightly from $0.01 to $0.02, the median duration
they would expect to keep positions open at least doubles. Adding another 1
cent to the prot target at least triples the expected trade duration. Also, the
standard deviation of expected trade durations increases 20% for each additional
cent demanded. In the extreme, one single position in Lloyds TSB remained
open throughout the entire sample period. The mispricing process in that single
case never reached its prot target of $0.01. On the other hand, widening the
trade entry threshold results in shorter trade durations but a decreased number
of trades.
Taken together, these observations suggest that a major disincentive to arbitrage
stems from the uncertainty regarding trade duration. This is not surprising in
an environment with near-perfect substitutes. The uncertainty relates directly
to the per-trade prot target demanded by arbitrageurs. To this end, Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) and Kondor (2009) argue that synchronization
problems and the hope of \even better opportunities tomorrow" can lead to the
persistence of mispricings. Note however, that these observations are consistent
with Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) who argue that mispricings are necessary
to incentivise arbitrageurs to correct pricing ineciencies.
One nal explanation regarding the existence of mispricings is inspired by
Schultz and Shive (2010), who ask \Do pricing disequilibria actually constitute
mispricings?". The authors examine dual-listed companies whose shares carry
dierent voting rights. In such a context, a deviation from price parity need not
necessarily indicate a mispricing, as dierent classes of shares carry premiums
associated with the conditions of ownership. In the context of this chapter,
besides the currency denomination, stocks and ADRs are identical securities in
every regard (see Pulatkonak and Soanos (1999)). It is therefore likely that a
deviation from parity constitutes a mispricing.117
4.5 - Conclusion
This chapter reveals an important price-correcting mechanism in the stock-ADR
market that had been overlooked by the existing literature. In so doing, this
chapter essentially achieves two things. First, it provides compelling evidence
that actual parity enforcement mechanism in UK stock-ADR parity is pairs
trading and not the direct arbitrage approach, as is ubiquituously assumed in this
literature. Second, it establishes that the risk associated with pairs trading in this
context is very low, is bounded by the ability to implement direct arbitrage on an
existing pairs trade and is thus limited to concerns about slow or non-convergence
of prices, rather than fears of their divergence.
When applied to a comprehensive sample of 25 UK stock-ADR pairs, pairs
trading returns 1.45% in excess of the risk-free rate. Exploitable opportunities
appear randomly throughout the interval in which the UK and US markets trade
contemporaneously, with a mild concentration at the US open and UK close. In
contrast, only a single protable trading opportunity can be observed using the
direct arbitrage approach over the same period.
Stock-ADR arbitrage entails no fundamental risk since the two securities are
identical and are two-way convertible. The dynamics of mispricings are shown
to be highly mean-reverting, exhibit minimal volatility and have short half-lives.
However, this work nd that the main disincentive to stock-ADR arbitrage stems
from uncertainty about the duration of the pairs trade. For each additional cent
demanded by arbitrageurs in per-share prot, the expected trade duration more
than doubles, and the standard deviation of trade duration increases by 20%.
Finally, arbitrageurs who set their trade entry bounds higher will experience less
duration uncertainty but will observe fewer trading opportunities.
Overall, the results of this chapter show that stock-ADR arbitrage is characterized
by a high incidence of small, short-lived, exploitable mispricings. Arbitrage is an118
important element in enforcing stock-ADR parity, and is demonstrably successful
at doing so. This analysis constitutes evidence in support of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980) in that pricing anomalies incentivise arbitrageurs to restore
price eciency.
The work presented here could easily be extended to examine the role of
arbitrage in other settings. Of particular interest to us for future work is the
implementation of the pairs trading strategy to ADRs originating in emerging
markets. Pairs-trading in this scenario circumvents many barriers to the direct
arbitrage approach, especially restrictions stock-ADR convertibility which render
direct arbitrage infeasible.119
Chapter 5
Ultra High Frequency Statistical Arbitrage
Across International Index Futures
Abstract
This chapter shows that exploitable lead-lag relations of the order of a few
hundred milliseconds exist in the three pairings between the S&P 500, FTSE 100,
and DAX futures contracts. These relations exhibit clear intra-daily patterns,
particularly around the US open, the European close, and the announcement of
country data. Using this information, this chapter forecasts mid-quote changes in
lagging contracts with a directional accuracy in excess of 85%. A simple statistical
arbitrage strategy exploiting these relations yields economically signicant prots
which are robust to market impact costs and the bid-ask spread. However, returns
are sensitive to the risk of slippage, and the most protable trading opportunities
rarely exist for longer than 300 milliseconds. Hence, it is highlighted that price
slippage and infrastructure costs are the most signicant limits to arbitrage in
this market setting. Overall, the results presented here accord with the view
that informational ineciencies incentivise arbitrageurs to appropriate pricing
anomalies.
Keywords: Lead-Lag Relationships, Futures Markets, Hayashi-Yoshida Cross
Correlation Estimator, Statistical Arbitrage.
JEL classication: F36, G14, G15.120
5.1 -Introduction
Employing a recent advance in the statistical measurement of lead/lag
relationships (Hayashi and Yoshida (2005), Homan et al (2010)), this chapter's
principal contribution is to uncover the existence of sub-second exploitable
disequilibria which occur across international index futures. The original
methodology of Hayashi and Yoshida (2005) for measuring cross-correlation was
extended by Homan et al. (2010) to measure lagged correlations, and it is on
the latter work that the research presented here is based.
This chapter is motivated by evidence of increasing international nancial
integration in recent years (Ayuso and Blanco (2001), Kearney and Lucey (2004),
Evans and Hnatkovska (2005)). If on the one hand, markets were perfectly
integrated, ecient, and frictionless, then returns on closely related securities
would exhibit perfect simultaneity and contemporaneous correlation, so as to
preclude the possibility of cross-market arbitrage (De Jong and Donders (1998)).
On the other hand, there is wide evidence that frictions impede the ow of
information across markets (Lo and Mackinlay (1990)), and give rise to lead/lag
patterns.
1 Now, if the price adjustment process is not instantaneous, then
the question arises: Do lead/lag patterns across segmented markets induce
cross-market predictability? Does information about future price adjustments
admit the possibility of arbitrage?
This is the rst work to provide answers to these questions within the important
but overlooked context of international stock index futures. Specically, this work
focusses on lead/lag relations in the three pairings between the S&P 500, FTSE
100, and DAX futures contracts. While previous works focus on the relation
between futures contracts and their underlying stock indices, the vast majority
1Examples include the S&P 500 futures vs spot in Kawaller et al. (1987), the Major Market
Index futures vs spot in Stoll and Whaley (1990), and the FTSE 100 futures vs spot in Brooks
et al. (2001).121
highlight factors such as trading costs, price staleness, and illiquidity in the index
constituents which render spot-futures arbitrage infeasible (see e.g. Brennan and
Schwartz (1990)). In contrast, futures contracts are highly liquid instruments
with low upfront capital requirements and trading costs. Therefore, one could
argue that pairs of futures contracts constitute an ideal setting under which to
examine lead/lag relationships.
The extant literature is complemented in four ways. Firstly, this work employs the
Hayashi-Yoshida (Hayashi and Yoshida (2005), hereafter HY) cross-correlation
estimator to measure the speed of price adjustment. The HY estimator readily
allows for irregular and non-synchronous quote arrival times without the need
for coarse resampling. This feature allows us to examine microscopic lead/lag
patterns, which is particularly useful as it is found that the majority of price
adjustments take place at sub-second intervals. Secondly, Best Bid and Oer
(BBO) quote data is employed, time-stamped to the millisecond. BBO quotes
form the top level of the Central Limit Order Book, thus constituting a continuous
price series free of stale quotes. The use of ultra-high frequency data is
crucially important, because the speed of price adjustment is likely to be high
in electronically traded markets. Thirdly, this chapter places emphasis on both
the forecasting accuracy, and arbitrage returns, in assessing the evidence against
cross-market eciency. Finally, this chapter documents the risks and costs which
constitute the greatest limits to arbitrage in this market setting.
The results of this chapter show evidence of highly signicant lead/lag
relationships between the three pairs. On average, the S&P 500 leads the FTSE
100 and DAX contracts by 98 and 349 milliseconds respectively, consistent with
the notion that international price discovery originates in the US. The FTSE
100 leads the DAX contract by 33 milliseconds on average. Some evidence of
bi-directional causality is found in the FTSE-DAX pair, but very little between122
either transatlantic pair. Further, the FTSE-DAX pair is more strongly correlated
than either transatlantic pair, in line with the notion of imperfect international
integration (Jorion and Schwartz (1986)).
The lead/lag relations across all pairs exhibit strong intraday seasonality:
Correlations among all pairs peak around daily economic announcements at 13:30
GMT, and fall sharply when the FTSE 100 and DAX cash markets close at 16:30
GMT, rebounding in evening trade. The S&P 500 contract increases its lead over
both FTSE 100 and DAX contracts at the announcement of data, at 14:30 GMT
when the S&P 500 cash market opens, and at the European close. It is important
to note that none of these results are the product of statistical artifacts arising
from dierences in liquidity or quote arrival frequency.
Based on simple threshold triggers, mid-quote moves of leading contracts forecast
subsequent moves of lagging contracts with a directional accuracy of over 85%.
This accuracy relates directly to the sensitivity of the threshold: The more
conservative the threshold, the \cleaner" the trigger signal, and the more accurate
the forecast.
Finally, a simple trading exercise provides evidence against auto-eciency across
international markets. Leading mid-quote moves are used to generate buy/sell
signals in lagging contracts, and the returns aggregated net of all costs. Arbitrage
prots are economically and statistically signicant - a strategy that trades only
5 contracts per trading signal generates aggregate prots of around GBP 100,000
per month. However, returns are sensitive to the risk of price slippage: Around
half the prots disappear if 20% of trades execute at the next best price. Further,
the windows of arbitrage opportunity are narrow, with the most protable trades
rarely existing for more than 300 milliseconds. This suggests that technology
costs are a signicant consideration for arbitrageurs in this setting.123
Overall, it is concluded that information ows across international markets are not
instantaneous, but rather exhibit brief delays. Importantly, these delays last long
enough, and induce pricing anomalies large enough, to compensate arbitrageurs
for appropriating pricing disequilibria. These results accord with the Grossman
and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) suggestion that temporary disequilibria incentivise
arbitrageurs to correct pricing anomalies. Though clearly, the authors did not
have in mind the kind of trading frequency studied in this chapter, it is interesting
that the results of this chapter supports their view in the high-frequency domain.
5.2 - Related Literature
Introduced in February 1982 by the Kansas City Board of Trade, the Value Line
contract was the world's rst index futures contract, followed shortly by the
S&P 500 contract (Gulen and Mayhew (2000)). As futures and other derivative
contracts become more pervasive, research exploring the link between these
and their underlying markets, as well as across markets, becomes increasingly
focal. The work presented here is related to two broad streams of literature
which constitute a substantial body of work documenting inter-market pricing
relationships.
The rst stream explores price discovery and the temporal pricing relationship
between futures contracts and the underlying cash index. The seminal research of
Zeckhauser and Niederhoer (1983) documents the possibility that futures prices
can predict spot prices.
2 The early work involving intraday data of Kawaller
et al. (1987) provides evidence that US futures prices lead spot prices with a
time lag of around 45 minutes. The authors attribute this lag to the inertia of
stock trading relative to futures trading, which implies that the futures market
contributes most to price discovery. Similarly, Herbst et al. (1987) and Stoll and
2The term spot refers to the underlying index cash market - e.g. the constituent stocks of an
index, gold bullion, or barrels of oil.124
Whaley (1990) document that futures prices lead spot prices by around 8 minutes,
whereas Wang and Wang (2001) show that price discovery is bi-directional when
volatility is high.
The spot-futures relationship has also been explored for a number of dierent
countries. Wahab and Lashgari (1993), Abhyankar (1998), Brooks et al. (2001),
and Brooks and Garrett (2002) analyze UK spot-futures data, Tse (1995) explores
the Japanese spot-futures relationship, while the case of Greece is examined in
Kenourgios (2004) and Andreou and Pierides (2008). These works largely conrm
the notion that futures prices lead spot prices, suggesting that price discovery
takes place in the futures market. But what is the signicance of these pricing
relationships?
This question is explored in the second stream of literature to which this work
belongs. On the one hand, an important implication of a lead/lag relationship is
the potential for cross-market return predictability and arbitrage. On the other
hand, the authors in Brooks et al. (2001) point out that while futures markets
are capable of responding to new information quickly, the cash index can only
fully respond once every constituent stock price updates. An important question
then arises: Is a persistent lead/lag relationship evidence of market ineciency?
While works such as Figlewski (1984, 1985), Brennan and Schwartz (1990),
Thomas (2002), Richie et al. (2008), and Cummings and Frino (2011) document
evidence of signicant disequilibria in the spot-futures relation, there are two
commonalities in these works: First, the nature of the pricing relation examined
therein is not a temporal one based on lead/lag eects, but rather a mispricing
approach based on a cost of carry model. Second, disequilibria in these works
are frequently attributed to transaction costs, market (im)maturity, and liquidity
eects that give rise to disequilibria while precluding arbitrage.125
The literature exploring arbitrage based on lead/lag relationships is relatively
sparse. Stoll and Whaley (1990) suggest that although futures generally lead spot
prices, the eect is not uni-directional, making spot-futures arbitrage dicult.
Brooks et al. (2001) compare several forecasting models and demonstrate that
the FTSE 100 futures contract can achieve over 65% accuracy when forecasting
the FTSE 100 index. However, when a trading strategy based on this is tested,
prots are not robust to trading costs.
This chapter relates to these works by placing emphasis on the predictability
of returns, and the protability of arbitrage. However, unlike these works, the
work presented here pursues this theme in an international setting. Indeed, one
major commonality linking these works is a focus on inter-market relationships
within the same country. Now, recent advances in communications technology
have contributed to the integration of similar but otherwise fragmented markets.
One direct consequence of this integration is a trend towards the equalization of
expected returns across global markets - a single \relevant" event is able to move
global stock market indices jointly (Eiteman et al (1994), Medeiros et al. (2009)).
There are several works which explore temporal relationships across international
markets (Eun and Shim (1989), Hamao et al. (1990), Abhyankar et al. (1997),
Antoniou et al (2003), Innocenti et al. (2011)). However, few focus explicitly on
the link between lead/lag eects and arbitrage, none employ high-frequency data,
and none focus on futures contracts. So why is doing so important? Employing
high-frequency data is particularly important to uncover temporal relations
which are invisible to the discrete-price observer. Goetzmann et al. (2005)
document a dramatic increase in global market correlations over the last two
decades, which increases international market integration and naturally pushes
evidence of lead/lag relationships deeper into the sub-minute and sub-second
space. Examining the link between lead/lag eects and arbitrage has important126
implications towards the theory of Ecient Markets. Finally, using futures data
mitigates many of the limitations of spot-futures arbitrage, such as transaction
costs and illiquidity. Therefore, exploring lead/lag relationships across dierent
futures contracts provides an important platform on which to test for inter-market
predictability and arbitrage.
A major risk inherent in the type of trading explored in this chapter stems
from the fact that the contracts under investigation are not perfect substitutes.
Arbitrage in this context relies on exploiting a statistical relationship based
on economic fundamentals. Invariably, arbitrageurs are vulnerable to noise
traders, who may trade the individual contracts for reasons other than to exploit
pricing disequilibria (De Long et al. (1990)), at highly unfavourable times for
arbitrageurs.
In what follows, this chapter employs BBO quotes time-stamped to the
millisecond for the S&P 500, FTSE 100, and DAX futures. These contracts
are highly liquid nancial securities based which represent the broad markets
of three major developed economies. By using them, one can mitigate to the
greatest extent possible the transaction cost barrier, and the spurious lead/lag
relation generated by liquidity dierences across the contracts. Anticipating
that lead/lag patterns occur at very ne timescales, this work employs the HY
estimator which is statistically robust to non-synchronous trading and irregular
quote-arrival times.
5.3 - Data and Methodology
This section provides details of the data and data renement procedures, together
with details of the precise implementation of the HY estimator. Also, the
performance of HY is contrasted against a common discretization procedure.127
Finally, this section provides details of the forecasting and trading strategy
employed.
5.3.1 Futures Contracts Data
The data consist of the three most liquid futures contracts globally, namely the
DAX, FTSE 100, and S&P 500 E-mini futures contracts.
3 For each contract, BBO
quotes are obtained containing price and volume information, time-stamped to
the millisecond. The data span the period January 9, 2012 - February 28, 2012.
Each contract is monitored for 12 hours per day, between 08:30 and 20:30 GMT.
The FTSE contract trades from 01:00 - 21:00 GMT; the DAX contract trades from
07:50 - 22:00 CET, and the S&P trades 24 hours per day with the exception of
times between 15:00 - 15:15, wherein quotes can be submitted by no executions are
permitted. The trading period chosen in this study overlaps all these contracts'
active trading hours.
Because futures contracts operate on a quarterly expiration cycle, the focus of this
study is on the the current \active" contracts, namely those expiring in March
2012. In all, the dataset consists of a number of BBO quotes in excess of 100
million.
The data is sourced from the CME, Eurex, and NYSE-Lie exchanges. Since
each of these exchanges is synchronized to an atomic clock (IOSCO (2012)),
the quote time-stamps reported for each exchange are precise to within one
microsecond, and contemporaneous to within one millisecond (Barua (2012)).
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the institutional features of the data set.
It can be seen from Table 5.1 that these contracts are highly liquid. Given
that the main aim of this chapter is to ultimately establish the existence of
arbitrage opportunities based on lead/lag relationships, the choice of data set
3The E-mini is the more liquid and electronically traded version of the S&P 500 contract.128
Table 5.1: Futures Data. Institutional features of the data set. The last two columns
show, as of January 2012, the average number of contracts traded, and the average daily
turnover.
is deliberately conservative, for it is well documented that liquidity and the
availability of arbitrage are inversely related.
The fourth column in Table 5.1 shows the minimum price increment in terms
of index points. To obtain the monetary value of this price increment, one
simply multiplies the number of index points by the multiplier. For example,
the minimum price increment of the FTSE 100 contract is $5.
Inspired by Schultz and Shive (2010), a number of crucial data ltering processes
are applied. Specically, data which qualies any of the following are excluded:
4
 Bid Price  Ask Price,
 Bid Volume = 0 and/or Ask Volume = 0,
 Ask Price > Bid Price by more than 25%,
 Mid quote return  25% or   25%.
Since this chapter makes use of BBO quotes, it is in eect continuously observing
the current best quote within the central order book. New BBO quotes arrive
when there is either a change in the current best price, or a change in the available
liquidity at the current best price. In the rst scenario, if a new quote arrives
that is better than the current best price, or an incoming trade consumes all the
liquidity available at the best price, the BBO price and volume update. In the
4In all, this process removes around 0.2% of the data.129
second scenario, if a new quote arrives at the current best price, or an incoming
trade does not consume all the currently available liquidity, the BBO volume
updates, but the price does not.
In view of establishing lead/lag relationships, the dierence between the above
two scenarios is non-trivial. If one monitors changes in the mid-quote, the rst
scenario will always yield a non-zero return, while the second scenario will always
yield a zero return. The main aim here is to establish whether mid-quote changes
in one futures contract portend corresponding changes in another. This aim is
best served by focussing purely on non-zero returns, and so all zero-returns from
the data are removed. This process carries the benet of allowing us to deem all
non-zero returns as informative to the lead/lag relationship.5 A similar procedure
is performed in Huth and Abergel (2012).
5.3.2 Trading Costs and the Representative Investor
Costs pertaining to futures trading consist of the bid/ask spread, which is
accounted for directly in the BBO quote data. Further, each exchange charges a
fee for order submission and clearing. These are outlined below.
Table 5.2: Exchange Costs. This table shows the costs for order submission and
clearing levied by the Eurex, NYSE-Lie, and CME Group. These relate to trading the
DAX, FTSE 100, and S&P 500 contracts, respectively.
The costs in Table 5.2 apply on a per-order basis, regardless of the size of the
order. Given that the notional amount of a single futures contract is 10, 25, or 50
times its underlying value (see Table 5.1), the costs in Table 5.2 are economically
5Grin and Oomen (2011) provide a thorough discussion of similar sub-sampling routines.130
small. However, the strategy described in this chapter warrants the submission of
a vast number of market orders aimed at exploiting minute pricing disequilibria
across these markets. The costs in Table 5.2 are negligible for a long-term investor,
but are a signicant consideration here.
With that in mind, the representative investor is akin to a quantitative hedge fund
utilizing a fully algorithmic strategy, with access to co-location services within
the exchange buildings. This type of investor is chosen for two reasons: Firstly,
all three contracts are 100% electronically traded. Hendershott et al. (2011)
provide evidence that some 70% of NYSE trades are executed by investors of this
type. Secondly, the approach in this chapter aims to exploit temporal pricing
disequilibria which exist predominantly in the sub-second horizon. Clearly, such
speeds lie beyond the scope of human traders.
5.3.3 The Hayashi-Yoshida Estimator
In Hayashi and Yoshida (2005),6 the authors introduce a novel estimator of the
covariance between two non-synchronous processes. Specically, let (
;F;P) be
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m = T Y respectively. Importantly, these observation times are assumed
independent of each other and of Xt and Yt - which in practical terms suggests
6For brevity, mathematical proofs in this section are omitted. However, the interested reader
is directed to works in which these proofs are available.131
two things. Firstly, the quote arrival frequency of one asset does not inuence
that of the other. Secondly, the quote arrival frequency of each asset does not
depend on the value of that asset.

























j denote time intervals between the arrival of quotes in assets X
and Y respectively, and this concept is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. Time Intervals. A time-line illustration of quote arrivals in X (top) and Y
(bottom). Quotes are marked \X". Intervals between quotes are marked IX and IY .
Figure 5.1 depicts a typical scenario encountered with high-frequency data.
Quotes arrive irregularly for each asset, and asynchronously across assets.
Robustly estimating the covariation between data which exhibit these phenomena





























































In practice, equations (3) and (4) amount to summing the product of all returns
between assets X and Y once they fully or partially share a time overlap. Because
of this property, the HY estimator allows for the inclusion of all data points,
without the need for regularizing (re-sampling) the data.
As it is currently stated, equation (4) measures the contemporaneous correlations
between X and Y . Homan et al. (2010) extend the estimator to allow for leads












where ` 2 R is the lag length (measured in units of time). Following the
same procedure in (2)-(4) arrives at a formula for the lagged version of the HY
estimator.133


























As it is now dened, equation (6) yields the entire cross-correlation curve
(hereafter HY curve) between X and Y . In practice, evaluating (6) amounts to
shifting the time-stamps of Y by amount ` and re-evaluating the HY correlation
HY . Doing this for all ` yields the HY curve.
In practical applications, it is important to establish the lag length ^ ` that
maximizes the correlation HY (^ `). Doing so allows conclusions to be drawn
about the temporal relationship between X and Y . For example, \X leads Y
by ^ ` seconds". The lag ^ ` is dened as a solution to the following equation:
(7) jHY (^ `)j = max
`2G
jHY (`)j;
over a time-grid G. In practice, this amounts to nding the peak of the HY curve.
Equivalently, evaluating (6) for dierent values of ` until a maximum is obtained.
Importantly, if it is found that ^ ` 6= 0, this would imply that the relationship
between X and Y is not contemporaneous. Specically, knowledge of one can
be used to explicitly forecast future movements in the other. It is precisely
this condition that this work relies on to examine lead/lag relations across
international futures contracts.
Finally, Huth and Abergel (2012) dene the notion of a lead/lag ratio (henceforth









where u is chosen such that `u  0.
The quantity HY (`) in (6) provides the correlation coecient when Y leads X by
` units of time, and similarly, the quantity HY ( `) provides the same measure
when Y lags X (i.e. X leads Y ) by ` units of time. With this in mind, the
purpose of the LLR is simply to compare the evidence of these two phenomena. It
is established in the literature that lead/lag relationships are often bi-directional
(Wang and Wang (2001) among others). The LLR is informative in decoupling
bi-directional relationships into relative strengths at dierent lags. Put simply, it
is a metric which is useful in assessing the strength and direction of the lead/lag
relationship.
5.3.4 Robustness to Spurious Lead/Lag Relations
This section evaluates the robustness of HY to dierences in liquidity. Further,
it contrasts the performance of HY against a commonly employed method of
measuring covariation.
It is well known that liquid7 assets tend to lead less liquid ones, due to their
ability to impound information faster (Lo and Mackinlay (1990) and Brooks
et al. (2001)). However, liquidity dierences could also give rise to spurious
conclusions toward lead/lag relationships. For example, data that are known to
be contemporaneously correlated but contain dierences in trading activity must
not exhibit any lead/lag eects (Voev and Lunde (2007)). Discovery of a non-zero
lag in this case would by denition be spurious. It is therefore important that
7In this case, liquidity refers to trading/quoting activity.135
any employed estimator be robust to articial liquidity eects, particularly when
dealing with high-frequency data.
This section examines the robustness of HY to spurious lead/lag relations by way
of an exercise involving synthetic data. The benet of using synthetic data is
simple - the input parameters are known, hence it is clear what output to expect.
This exercise involves sampling from the stochastic processes X and Y in (1) along
two independent Poisson time-grids with intensities X and Y respectively.8 The
data span 24 hours, and samples are observed to the nearest millisecond. Further,
it is imposed that X leads Y by 400 milliseconds (0.4 seconds). At this lag length,
a correlation between X and Y of 90% is imposed.
This exercise measures lead/lags between -10 and 10 seconds, with 10-millisecond
increments. Specically, a grid G is chosen from (7) such that:
` 2 f 10; 9:99; 9:98;:::; 0:01;0;0:01;:::;9:98;9:99;10g:
Further, the exercise is repeated for dierent liquidity combinations between
assets X and Y . This is achieved by varying the ratio
Y
X 2 f0:5;1;2;5g. This
step is aimed at examining how the estimated lead/lag relation is aected by
dierences in liquidity. For example, the ratio
Y
X = 5 suggests that the average
interval between price updates for asset Y is 5 times that for asset X. Figure 5.2
shows the results of the HY exercise.
It is clear from Figure 5.2 that the HY estimator is robust to spurious temporal
relations induced by liquidity dierences between assets - it correctly recovers
the true lead/lag relationship between X and Y under all combinations of
Y
X.
8Here, X and Y can be thought of as proxies for illiquidity: The lower their value, the shorter
the average interval between price updates.136
Figure 5.2. HY Curve on Synthetic Data. This gure shows the HY-estimated
correlation between X and Y at various lags ` 2 [ 10;10]. A dotted vertical line denotes
the \true" lead/lag relationship with X leading Y by 0.4 seconds (^ ` =  0:4). The four
curves represent repetitions of the HY exercise with various liquidity ratios: Y
X = 0:5
shown in red, Y
X = 1 in green, Y
X = 2 in blue, and Y
X = 5 in purple.
This property of HY is useful to the examination of temporal relationships using
high-frequency data.
It is informative to contrast the performance of HY against that of a commonly
employed methodology, namely previous-tick interpolation, henceforth PT.9 For
completeness, the results of the same exercise using the PT method are presented.
The intuitive idea behind the PT method is to regularize irregularly-spaced and
non-synchronous prices onto a synchronous time-grid with xed and constant
intervals. Where there is no price update between two or more consecutive points
on the regularized grid, the previous price is interpolated forward. Formally, and
using the denitions in (2), let:
9for a thorough discussion, see Voev and Lunde (2007), Homan et al. (2010), and Grin and
Oomen (2011).137
(9) Xt = X(I
X
i ) and, Y t = Y (I
Y
j );
denote the PT-interpolated versions of X and Y in (1), then for a xed-interval
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The extension of PT to incorporate leads and lags PT(`) is similar to that of
HY in (6).
Let us now repeat the estimation exercise using the PT method. This is done for
various mesh sizes h 2 f0:1;0:5;1g seconds. The results are given in Figure 5.3.
There are two interesting phenomena evident in Figure 5.3. First, the PT
estimation procedure is adversely aected by dierences in liquidity. For example,
in the bottom-left panel where price updates in X occur on average 5 times as
frequently as those in Y , the PT approach suggests that X leads Y by between
3 and 3.4 seconds, which is clearly not true. Second, although a smaller mesh
size h yields a more accurate estimate of the true lag ^ `, it also results in a more
biased estimate of the true correlation (Epps (1979)). Overall, the results of this
section motivate the use of HY in dealing with high-frequency data.
5.3.5 The Trading Strategy
Knowledge of the temporal relationship between a pair of contracts can be
used to build statistical arbitrage strategies based on exploiting the temporal
disequilibria. In principle, one would expect that a higher temporal correlation
would yield greater trading prots, but also more competition from other138
Figure 5.3. PT Curve on Synthetic Data. This gure shows the PT-estimated
correlation between X and Y at various lags ` 2 [ 10;10]. A dotted vertical line denotes
the \true" lead/lag relationship with X leading Y by 0.4 seconds (^ ` =  0:4). The three
curves in each panel represent repetitions of the PT exercise with various mesh sizes:
h = 0:1 shown in red, h = 0:5 in green, and h = 1 in blue. The four panels represent
dierent liquidity combinations Y
X across X and Y . Lags which maximize the correlation
are given by \Lag".
arbitrageurs. On the other hand, lower temporal correlation would not intuitively
yield higher prots, but arbitrageurs in the latter space would face less
competition from others interested in exploiting the temporal disequilibria. This
section shows how to apply the knowledge of the lead/lag relationship to forecast
and exploit mid-quote changes in the lagging contract, based on mid-quote
changes in the leading contract.139
The forecasting and trading devices employed here are motivated by Huth and
Abergel (2012) and Kozhan and Tham (2012). Given contracts X and Y ,
observing both time-series simultaneously amounts to observing sets of contiguous
quotes in X interspersed with sets of contiguous quotes in Y . Hence let us dene
a cluster of mid-quote returns fCX
i;n : i;n 2 N+g in contract X as a sequence
of contiguous mid-quote returns in X uninterrupted by returns in Y . A similar
denition of CY
i;n holds for contract Y . Here, the subscript i refers to the cluster
index (the number of clusters already observed), whereas the subscript n refers
to the mid-quote return index within each cluster. This concept is illustrated
graphically in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4. Quote Clusters. A time-line illustration of contiguous sequences of
mid-quote returns. Returns in asset X are marked X and returns in asset Y are marked
O, while X-clusters and Y -clusters are marked with CX
i;n and CY
i;n respectively.
Once the leading contract is distinguished from the lagging contract within the
HY framework, one can use this information to build a statistical arbitrage trading






> > > > > <

















i is the position taken in contract Y , and where +1 and  1 denote
long and short positions, respectively. The quantity K > 0 is a pre-set threshold.
Intuitively, equation (11) describes a simple trading strategy: Given that X leads
Y , a signal to trade Y is generated whenever the price of X moves by an amount
greater than K in the current X-cluster (i.e. before the price of Y moves).10 If
Y moves in the interim, no trading signal is generated and the process restarts in
the following X-cluster. The motivation for including a threshold in the trading
strategy stems from the fact that exploiting microscopic price \jumps" is fruitless,
unless the magnitudes of these jumps exceed the costs associated with trading
(Brooks et al. (2001)). It is important to note that the trading strategy (11)
depends only on present and past price observations of the leading contract.
When a signal to trade Y is generated in the current X-cluster, a position in Y is
immediately opened and held for the entire duration of the following Y -cluster.








i+;n : n  1;  1g
NY
i ; otherwise.
Taken together, equations (11) and (12) fully describe the algorithm by which
temporal disequilibria are exploited between leading contract X and lagging
contract Y . The calculation of prot P for each Y -cluster is as follows: First, the
position taken in cluster i is multiplied by the sum of the individual mid-quote
returns in cluster i, and then trading costs are subtracted:








10Since all C denote mid-quote returns, it is easier to measure K in terms of ticks. Conversion
between ticks and monetary value is done easily via Table 5.1141
where ci is the all-inclusive cost of trading. Calculating total prots amounts to
summing the individual Pi over all clusters in the data set:




Alongside the trading strategy, this section measures the directional accuracy by























where sgn() is the signum function. Equation (15) essentially measures whether
the aggregate returns in the current X-cluster portend the sign of the aggregate
returns in the subsequent Y -cluster. Arriving at a nal measure of directional
forecasting accuracy is intuitive: sum all Fi and divide by the number of clusters
in the data set:





where sup() denotes the supremum.
An important question related to the forecasting accuracy is whether the accuracy
is aected by the choice of signal threshold K in (11). One might expect that a
stronger trading signal (i.e. higher K) would intuitively yield a higher directional
forecasting accuracy of X over Y . To help investigate this, equations (15) and
(16) are evaluated over all clusters in which a trade has been generated.142
5.4 - Empirical Results
This section applies the analysis of section 5.3 to the three contract pairs within
the data set, namely the FTSE - DAX, S&P - FTSE, and S&P - DAX March 2012
pairs. For the remainder of this chapter, let us dene the following conventions:
First, the leading asset, as in the above list, is named rst. Second, graphs
pertaining to each pair will be coloured blue, green, and red, respectively. Third,
the numerator of the lead/lag ratio (8) refers to the rst-named contract; thus a
highly asymmetrical left-heavy HY curve with LLR  1 shows strong evidence
that the rst-named leads.
This section starts by exploring the three lead/lag relationships, and prole the
intraday patterns of these relationships. Then, this section forecasts and trades
lagging contracts based on signals generated by mid-quote changes in leading
contracts. Finally, a discussion is presented about the limits to arbitrage across
international futures contracts.
5.4.1 The Lead/Lag Relationship Between Futures Contracts
There are 35 full trading days (hereafter \days") in the sample. For each day,
the entire HY cross-correlation curve is estimatee based on equation (6), then the
curves are averaged for each pair over all days. Ultimately, this section obtains
a single HY curve for each contract pair. This step helps quantify the relative
strength and direction of the lead/lag relationships for each of the contract pairs.
For each contract pair, leads and lags of mid-quote returns are measured on
a horizon of  30 to 30 seconds, with 5-millisecond increments. This section
justies this horizon by the fact that cross-correlations across all pairs diminish
substantially within a few seconds. A grid G is chosen from (7) such that:143
` 2 f 30; 29:995; 29:990;:::; 0:005;0;0:005;:::;29:990;29:995;30g:
The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5. Lead/Lag Relationships. The HY curves plotted for each contract pair.
Left panels show lag lengths ` 2 [ 30;30] seconds. Right panels zoom in on lag lengths
` 2 [ 0:5;0:5] seconds. In regions to the left of the vertical zero-line in each panel, the
contract whose name appears rst in the title leads, and vice versa.
Figure 5.5 displays evidence of strongly asymmetric lead/lag relationships, in
which the S&P 500 contract leads both the FTSE 100 and DAX contracts.144
The relationship between the FTSE 100 and DAX contracts is less pronounced,
though it is clear that the FTSE leads the DAX contract. These results are
qualitatively consistent with other works documenting international price linkages
(Innocenti et al. (2011) among others), and the notion that international price
discovery occurs in the US. Further, by looking at the left-hand panels in Figure
5.5, what is particularly striking is the speed at which the HY cross-correlation
curves diminish towards zero across all three pairs. In other words, the panels in
Figure 5.5 display evidence of high nancial integration across the three contract
pairs. This is conrmed by examining the right-hand panels, which reveal that
point estimates of the lead/lag relationships, or equivalently the peaks of the HY
curves, are of the order of milliseconds. This observation is striking because it has
important implications for works examining international pricing relationships:
by using non-granular data, it is easy to achieve the illusory eect of perfect
contemporaneous correlation, as documented in Section 5.3.4 of this chapter.
Let us quantify the strength and direction of the lead/lag relationships in terms
of three parameters, namely the lag length ^ ` which maximizes the correlation
between a given contract pair, the maximum correlation itself ^ HY , and the
lead/lag ratio LLR. These results are given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3. Lead/Lag Relationships. Three contract pairs along with summary
statistics. The third and fourth columns show, respectively, the mean and median of
the lag length ^ `, by which the leader (second column) leads. The fth and sixth column
show, respectively, the maximum correlation ^ HY and lead/lag ratios for each pair.
Table 5.3 reveals intuitive insights into the nature of the lead/lag relationships
under investigation. Lag lengths, maximum correlations, and lead/lag ratios all145
appear to be directly related to the pairwise geographical distances between the
markets.
Given that market information pertinent to any lead/lag relationship must
traverse geographical distances, it is natural to wonder whether the lag lengths
reported in Table 5.3 are not indicative of price discovery, but merely the result of
delays in the physical transmission of data. The latter is unlikely. Built in 1999 by
Global Crossing, the current transatlantic communication network (AC-1) spans
14,000 km, and links the US and major European markets via bre-optic cables.
One-way transmission between New York and London takes 32.4 milliseconds (see
Johnson et al. (2012) and references therein). By extrapolating this number to
the distances between the CME, NYSE-Lie, and Eurex, it is unlikely that the
lag lengths in Table 5.3 are the result of physical delays. Further, Hasbrouck
and Saar (2012) suggest that the entire event-analysis-action cycle for co-located
algorithmic trading systems is less than 2 milliseconds.
By examining the HY curves generated for each day in the sample, one can reject
at the 90%-level the statistical hypothesis that the maximum correlation occurs
at zero lag for the FTSE-DAX pair; and at the 99%-level for both transatlantic
pairs. This result is not surprising, given the proximity of the NYSE-Lie to the
Eurex, relative to either transatlantic distance.
5.4.2 The Intraday Prole of Lead/Lag Relationships
It is a well-known stylized fact that nancial markets produce intraday patterns
(e.g. U-shaped volatility). Having established an overall lead/lag structure across
the three contract pairs, let us turn attention to the intraday prole of these
relationships.146
This section splits each day into 24 half-hourly intervals, spanning 08:30 - 20:30
GMT. For each interval, over each day, and for each contract pair, let us measure
the same three quantities as in Table 5.3, namely the Lead/Lag ratio, the
maximum correlation ^ HY , and the lag length ^ ` which maximizes the correlation.
Let us then average these results over the number of days. Ultimately, three
24-point curves are obtained: one for each contract pair. The results of this
exercise are shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6 reveals clear evidence of intraday seasonality exhibited for all three
pairs. The daily events most interesting to us are the announcement of
macroeconomic news at 13:30 GMT, the US cash market open at 14:30 GMT, and
the close of both UK and German cash markets at 16:30 GMT. All three panels
conrm that for each pair, mid-quote returns in the rst-named contracts portend
mid-quote returns in the second-named contracts. Although this notion was
established in the previous section, Figure 5.6 shows that this eect is consistent
throughout the day.
The Lead/Lag ratio generally decreases (towards unity) throughout the day,
indicating a diminishing asymmetry in the HY curves. This implies that the
pairwise causal link between the leading and lagging contracts deteriorates
throughout the day (Huth and Abergel (2012)). The maximum correlation
remains largely range-bound, and the lag length largely constant. Notable
exceptions to the above are as follows: Around the announcement of
macroeconomic data, the LLR and maximum correlation both increase, while
in terms of lag length, the US increases its leads over both UK and German
contracts. This indicates that both UK and German traders react more
attentively to cues from the US market, which impounds information rst. The
same eect occurs at the US cash market open. Following the close of the UK and
German cash markets, the US sharply increases its lead over each, but both the147
Figure 5.6. Lead/Lag Intraday Prole. Intraday patterns in the Lead/Lag Ratio
(top), Maximum Correlation ^ HY (middle), and Lag Length ^ ` (bottom). Times on the
horizontal axes refer to the previous half-hour interval (e.g. 10:00 refers to the 09:30-10:00
interval).
LLR and maximum correlation across all three pairs fall sharply. Taken together,
these observations suggest that at the close of the UK and German markets, the
FTSE and DAX contracts are less sensitive to global factors, and more so to local
factors (Jorion and Schwartz (1986)).148
5.4.3 Trading Results: Exploiting Temporal Disequilibria
This section performs the statistical arbitrage exercise based on the methodology
presented in section 5.3.5. Note that the trading strategy relies only on present
and past mid-quote observations. Importantly, the trading strategy is simple
in nature, and uses no ex-ante knowledge of the dynamic lead/lag relationship
presented in section 5.4.2. This way, the entire data set is taken as out-of-sample
for forecasting and trading purposes. Although it is discussed later how one may
enhance the trading strategy by incorporating the information conveyed via the
HY output, the results presented here rely chiey on the simple strategy (11) -
(12), in the interests of robustness.
Let us begin by presenting the accumulated prots gained by trading the FTSE -
DAX, S&P - FTSE, and S&P - DAX pairs over the number of days in the sample.
Throughout, the convention that the rst-named contract leads is maintained.
Initially, this analysis imposes a signal threshold K = 5 ticks in equation (11).
That is to say, a trading signal is generated in the lagging contract whenever a
cluster of leading quotes is encountered, wherein the mid-quote moves by 5 or
more ticks in any aggregate direction. The position is then held open until the
end of the lagging cluster. Later, the signal threshold is varied to examine the
eect of the signal on arbitrage prots. Furthermore, this section initially imposes
that the arbitrageur trades a single contract per signal; a step that ensures no
market-impact costs, since this chapter employ BBO quotes. Figure 5.7 shows
the accumulated wealth gained by trading the three contract pairs, following the
strategy (11) - (12). The curves denote prots over the 35-day sample period,
net of the bid-ask spread and all order submission and clearing costs.
It is worth pointing out that futures contracts are inherently leveraged, since
it is not required that the investor possess the full notional amount of the
contract (index points times multiplier). Typically, a clearing house will require149
Figure 5.7. Cumulative Prots. Prots gained by applying strategy (11)-(12) to the
three contract pairs over the 35 days in the sample. The vertical axis is measured in Euros
for the FTSE - DAX and S&P - DAX pairs, and Pounds Sterling for the S&P - FTSE pair.
the investor to post a margin equivalent to a small percentage of the contract's
notional value (Figlewski (1984), Reilly (1999), and Hancock (2005)). The exact
amount demanded by clearing houses to initiate a futures contract trade can
vary depending on the recent historical volatility of the contract. There is a risk
that, given an adverse market move, the investor may receive a margin call, or
face having to close part of a trading position at an unfavourable point in time.
However, in the context of the trading exercise presented here, this is unlikely,
since each trading position is held for a number of seconds.
Although each prot time-series trends consistently upwards, they exhibit vast
dierences in magnitude. The most protable pair is the FTSE - DAX, while
the least protable is the S&P - FTSE. One reason for this may relate to the
geographical proximity of London to Frankfurt: It is likely that the FTSE and
DAX contracts respond to a larger set of overlapping idiosyncratic factors than
either transatlantic pair, yielding a more consistent relationship. This suggestion
is conrmed by a greater magnitude of correlation, shown in Figure 5.5. Further,150
the low protability which characterizes the S&P - FTSE pair may be explained
by Werner and Kleidon's (1996) suggestion that the US-UK market is among the
most heavily arbitraged.
The prots in Figure 5.7 are measured in absolute, not percentage terms, for a
number of reasons: First, the arbitrageur does not know a priori the number
of trading opporutnities that would be presented on a given day. Works which
present returns in percentage terms such as Gatev et al. (2006) and De Jong
et al. (2009) rely on the full re-investment of capital per trading opportunity.
This is clearly not feasible here, since one cannot purchase futures contracts in
fractional amounts. Second, measuring prots in absolute terms makes this work
comparable to Suarez (2005), who measures the returns to a direct arbitrage
strategy in ADRs in absolute terms.
Now a study of the intraday prole of arbitrage is presented. Specically, the
analysis aggregates over the entire sample, the directional forecasting accuracy,
number of generated signals, and durations of protable disequilibria. The results
are shown in Figure 5.8.
The top panel of Figure 5.8 shows a consistently high directional forecasting
accuracy across all three contract pairs. Accuracy rates rise slightly following
the US open, which accords with the idea that the UK and German markets
follow the US more closely during this period. Further, accuracy rates fall
following the UK and German close, which is also an intuitive result exhibiting
the opposite eect. Following Huth and Abergel (2012), the analysis presented
here tests the robustness of the directional forecasts against both a random
forecast, and a forecast generated via an auto-correlation in the lagging contract.
The auto-correlation forecast slightly outperforms the random forecast, but is
not statistically signicantly better. The directional forecasts presented are151
Figure 5.8. Intraday Arbitrage Prole. Intraday patterns of Directional Forecasting
Accuracy (top), the total number of individual trades on a log10 scale (middle), and the
10th percentile duration length of protable disequilibria (bottom).
signicant at the 99% level for all contract pairs over all intervals in the sample,
with the exception of the S&P - DAX pair between 20:00 and 20:30.
The middle panel of Figure 5.8 shows that the number of trades (or equivalently,
trade signals) generated per interval increases sharply following the announcement
of market data and again following the US open. This increase is then maintained
for as long as all three cash markets remain open. The bottom panel plots the
10th-percentile reaction times, denoting interval durations between the point at
which a trade signal is generated, and the point at which the lagging contract
begins to move following the signal. This panel shows that reaction times decrease
following the announcement of market data, and remain low for as long as all three
cash markets are open, before gradually rising following the close of the UK and152
German markets. Taken together, these results suggest that market participants
who act to appropriate temporal disequilibria concentrate their activity during
specic periods.
5.4.4 Varying the Number of Contracts per Trade
So far, this chapter has assumed that the arbitrageur trades one single futures
contract each time a trading signal is generated. In reality, statistical arbitrage
systems of this kind are only protable if they can be scaled to yield economically
signicant prots.
Here, the trading exercise is repeated 20 times. At each repetition, the arbitrageur
is assumed to trade a number R of contracts per trade signal, where R 2
f1;2;:::;20g. Table 5.4 shows the results of this exercise.
Table 5.4. Number of Contracts per Trade. This table shows the eect on prots
of varying the number of contracts per trade from a single contract to 20. Prots are
converted to Euros for ease of comparison, and totalled in the nal column.153
Interestingly, as the arbitrageur trades a larger number of contracts, the strategy
benets from economies of scale with regard to trading costs. To see this, note
that the prots from trading 10 contracts per signal exceed ten times the prots
gained by trading 1. This is because exchange-related costs are charged per
market order, not per contract. Clearly, one cannot trade a large number of
contracts simultaneously without incurring market impact costs. This is discussed
in section 5.4.6.
5.4.5 Varying the Signal Threshold
Up to now, this work has assumed a pre-set signal threshold K. It is informative
to study the eects of varying this threshold on the protability of arbitrage.
Intuitively, a higher signal threshold yields better directional forecasts
protability, at the expense of a lower trading frequency. Studying the eects of
varying the signal threshold is informative to both academics and practitioners.
To academics, it establishes a link between the frequency of temporal price
disequilibria and risk. To practitioners, it permits an investigation into optimal
trading rules.
Let us proceed by varying the signal threshold from K 2 f1;2;:::;10g ticks. For
each instance and for each contract pair, several statistics are measured, namely
the aggregate directional forecasting accuracy, total number of trades, average
prot per trade, and 10th percentile reaction times. The results are shown in
Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 reveals several insights into the eects of varying the signal threshold
on arbitrage returns. The eects are consistent across all contract pairs. Firstly,
increasing the signal threshold directly increases the directional forecasting
accuracy. This result is consistent with the notion that increasing the signal154
Table 5.5. Varying the Signal Threshold This table shows, for each contract pair,
the eect of varying the signal threshold K from 1 to 10 ticks. For each instance, the table
shows the directional forecasting accuracy, total number of trades, prot per trade, and
10th percentile reaction time.
threshold results in a cleaner signal with which to trade. Similarly, while the
total number of trades falls sharply, the prot per trade increases. In particular,
despite low signal thresholds yielding directionally accurate forecasts, trading
based on low signal thresholds does not overcome costs. To practitioners, these
results can be used to devise optimal trading strategies.
The nal three rows of Table 5.5 are interesting. The 10th percentile reaction
times decline sharply as the signal threshold increases. In other words,
arbitrageurs who wait for stronger trade signals do so at the cost of facing
drastically shorter durations of disequilibria. This is consistent with the view that
competition among arbitrageurs acts to enforce pricing eciency (Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980)), thereby perpetuating the need to invest in technological
infrastructure. Clearly, this has a limit in the form of the speed of light. Over
time, the payo to investing in infrastructure would yield diminishing marginal
returns.155
It is informative to compare the reaction times stated in Table 5.5 to the
time it takes data to physically traverse the relevant geographical distances.
Recall from section 5.4.1 that one-way transmission between New York and
London takes 32.4 milliseconds via Global Crossing's AC-1 bre-optic cable.
By extrapolating this time to the distances between the CME, NYSE-Lie, and
Eurex, it is highly unlikely that any of the FTSE - DAX or S&P - DAX trades lie
inside the transmission speed boundary, even for high signal thresholds. This
is particularly striking for the FTSE - DAX pair, which benets from close
geographical proximity, and which has been shown to be more protable than
either transatlantic pair. It is therefore puzzling why the 10th percentile reaction
time for this pair should be signicantly higher than either transatlantic pair.
However, looking closely at the prots per trade is informative: The FTSE -
DAX pair generates a large number of trades, each of which is relatively less
protable than either transatlantic pair. This suggests that the FTSE - DAX pair
contains a relatively high idiosyncratic risk component which acts as a deterrent
to arbitrage.
Looking at the S&P - FTSE pair, a signal threshold K  9 suggests that for a
number of arbitrage opportunities, namely those at 37 milliseconds, the duration
of disequilibria lies at or just within the data transmission speed barrier. However,
it is noteworthy that in the entire sample, this phenomenon occurs for only one
single trade. Overall, the S&P - FTSE result is consistent with Werner and
Kleidon's (1996) suggestion that the US-UK market is among the most heavily
arbitraged.
Finally, it is important to note that the computing processes behind generating
a trading signal and managing a position require only the evaluation of one
logical operation and one oating-point operation per observed mid-quote, as
per (11) and (12). Modest desktop computing resources can perform these156
kinds of calculations within a small number of microseconds, akin to suggestions
by Hasbrouck and Saar (2012). As for the millisecond environment in which
this exercise operate, it is unlikely that the time required for calculation will
signicantly aect the visible duration of temporal disequilibria.
5.4.6 On the Limits of Arbitrage
The data set employed in this chapter consists of the three most liquid and widely
traded futures contracts globally, with no restrictions on trading or cross-border
arbitrage.
In markets such as this, professional arbitrageurs often compete over a limited
supply of available arbitrage opportunities. This competition creates an
imbalance stemming from the excess demand by arbitrageurs for protable trades.
As a result, competition among arbitrageurs eectively reduces the magnitude
and duration of protable disequilibria. This in turn creates a natural selection
mechanism by which arbitrageurs who possess the most powerful computing
resources survive. Overall, this system poses two major limits to arbitrage,
namely costs and risk.
Liquidity, price slippage, market impact, and competition for scarce opportunities
from other traders are all sources of risk for which arbitrageurs demand
compensation. This fact may explain why even seemingly riskless arbitrage
opportunities sometimes go unexploited. It is informative to explore the
eects each of these risks have on arbitrageurs' capacity to appropriate pricing
disequilibria, by examining their eects on protability.
The subsequent analysis parsimoniously captures the eects of liquidity risk, price
slippage, market impact, and competition from other arbitrageurs, following an
approach by Kozhan and Tham (2012). Specically, this section imposes that a157
Figure 5.9. Slippage Risk. The eect of having a percentage of trades fullled at the
next best price (horizontal) on the proportion of otherwise available prot opportunities
(vertical).
certain proportion of the arbitrageur's trades are not executed at the observed
(best) price, but at the next best price instead, which is assumed to be available
in innite supply. The next best price in the context of this work means a one-tick
increment down the limit order book, equivalent to GBP 5 and EUR 12.50 for
the FTSE 100 and DAX contracts, respectively. The objective of this exercise
is to see what eect this restriction has on the protability of the individual
arbitrageur. The results are shown in Figure 5.9.
For each contract pair, Figure 5.9 reveals the sensitivity of an arbitrageur's prots
to the risk of executing part of a trade at the next best price. This sensitivity is
particularly high for the FTSE-DAX pair, which is an intuitive result, given the
generally low per-trade protability of this pair as seen in Figure 5.8.
Further, one can interpret the results of this section within the context of Table
5.4, and ask: How is the probability of price slippage aected by increasing the
number of contracts per trade? In the data set, around 29% of FTSE 100 quotes158
on either the bid or ask side carry a size of 5 contracts or less, and around 46%
carry 11 or more contracts. The corresponding gures for the DAX are 49% and
22% respectively. Therefore, the FTSE 100 futures contract carries a greater
per-quote liquidity. Based on this, one can suggest that the risk of price slippage
is relatively less profound when the contract being traded is the FTSE 100.
Besides risk, the costs associated with trading in this market setting act as a
signicant deterrent to arbitrage. Figure 5.8 shows the directional forecasting
accuracy to be high. However, in order to prot from a trade, an arbitrageur
has to not only be directionally accurate, but also overcome the bid-ask spread.
Given that the majority of trades individually extract very small amounts of
prot, the bid-ask spread is a major cost incurred by arbitrageurs. Furthermore,
arbitrageurs face xed rents and other costs incurred through co-location
subscriptions and access to live market feeds. Hedge funds implementing these
kinds of strategies must also hire analysts to create and maintain computer code.
To the extent that these extra costs collectively diminish the prots reported
in Table 5.4, they act as a deterrent to arbitrage. Due to the costs involved,
one could suggest that arbitrage operations in this setting can most readily be
undertaken by larger hedge funds and proprietary trading desks whose co-located
infrastructure is not dedicated solely to this pursuit, but forms part of their overall
business activity.
Overall, this section highlights that technological infrastructure costs and the
risk of price slippage present signicant limits to arbitrage in the market for
international futures contracts.159
5.5 - Conclusion
This chapter complements previous work by examining pricing relationships in
the important but overlooked market setting of international index futures. This
chapter documents clear evidence of consistent sub-second lead/lag patterns
across the S&P 500, FTSE 100, and DAX futures contracts (in order of
leadership), suggesting that the diusion of information across these markets
is not instantaneous.
Importantly, this chapter shows that these lead/lag patterns induce predictability
in lagging assets, and give rise to protable disequilibria. Taken together, these
observations provide evidence against auto-eciency across international futures
markets, and suggest that arbitrage is an important component to information
ow across markets. However, arbitrage prots are sensitive to the risk of price
slippage, and protable opportunities rarely exist for more than 300 milliseconds.
Therefore, slippage risk and technological costs are highlighted as the most
signicant limits to arbitrage in this market setting.
The data employed consists of three highly liquid futures contracts, with no
capital controls and no restrictions to cross-border arbitrage. Based on this, this
work suggests that the results obtained in this chapter are generalizable to other
global markets. Furthermore, The importance of utilizing high-frequency data
is highlighted, based on compelling evidence that most of the price adjustment
mechanisms in these markets operate deep into the sub-second domain.
In this chapter, a key assumption has been that the prole of the temporal
correlation structure between any two futures contracts would remain so
out-of-sample. It may be that the temporal relationship is seasonal through time,
particularly with the FTSE-DAX pair, which exhibits bi-directional causality.
However, the correlation prole was demonstrably stable through the sample160
period, even when the sample period was split into individual days. It could
therefore be argued that this assumption is not unreasonable.
Future work could focus on extending the lead/lag analytical framework into
the multi-dimensional space. This would facilitate the analysis of global ows




The primary goal of this thesis has been to answer three big questions in Financial
Economics: 1) To what extent does aversion to fundamental risk diminish the
extent to which arbitrageurs are willing to correct pricing disequilibria? 2)
In the absence of fundamental risk, how eective is arbitrage at exploiting
pricing anomalies? 3) To what extent does arbitrage appropriate geographical
informational delays across markets?
Chapter 2 provided a review of the main relevant theoretical, empirical, and
methodological bodies of literature on which the answers to the above questions
are based. Chapters 3-5 then answered these questions, respectively. In addition
to reecting on the three main questions, opportunities arose along the way to
make additional contributions and insights which would hopefully benet future
research.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.1 provides a summary
of the gaps in the extant literature. Section 6.2 summarizes the contributions that
this thesis makes to the extant literature. Section 6.3 outlines the implications of
these ndings. Section 6.4 discusses the limitations of the work presented in this
thesis. Finally, section 6.5 suggests potential directions for future research.
6.1 - The Gaps in the Extant Literature
The rst goal of this thesis was to explore the behaviour of arbitrageurs who are
averse to fundamental risk. Fundamental risk is an important component of the
propensity of arbitrage to correct pricing disequilibria, and denotes the risk of162
deterioration in the fundamental relationship between prices of stocks which are
the subject of an arbitrage trade. Chapter 2 presented a summary of the empirical
literature which clearly recognizes the importance of this risk. While the intuitive
and obvious eect of aversion to fundamental risk would be for arbitrageurs to
trade more sceptically, the exact mechanics of this are poorly understood, because
as yet no quantitative characterization of this risk has been incorporated into an
arbitrageur's theoretical portfolio allocation problem. Understanding the exact
relationship between fundamental risk and arbitrage is important to developing
a fuller understanding of the relationship between arbitrage and price eciency.
The second goal of this thesis was to further our understanding about the extent to
which arbitrage can correct pricing anomalies that occur in an environment with
virtually no fundamental risk, namely the UK stock-ADR market. There is an
inconsistency in the extant literature that is presented in Chapter 2: On the one
hand, the body of empirical market microstructure works has documented a clear
segmentation between the US markets on which ADRs trade, and the domestic
markets on which the stock trades. In theory, such an environment should
constitute fertile ground for arbitrageurs, because the two securities in question
are perfect substitutes. On the other hand, the extant empirical literature nds
little evidence that arbitrage is protable in this environment. The gap in the
literature stems from the fact that existing works have focussed exclusively on
analysing the returns to direct arbitrage, and not statistical arbitrage. The latter
is important in addressing the puzzle that stock-ADR relationships appear to
exhibit price eciency despite the fact that neither arbitrageurs nor investors in
each of the two markets are incentivised to bring prices back into line.
The third goal that this thesis has set out to achieve is motivated by evidence of
increasing global correlations across markets. If markets were perfectly integrated
and frictionless, then any non-idiosyncratic price shock to one market would
be diused instantaneously and reected in prices across the other markets,163
so as to preclude the possibility of cross-border arbitrage. In reality, frictions
impede the ow of information, which means that the transmission of information
across correlated markets gives rise to lead/lag patterns. Whether arbitrage
is successful at appropriating such geographical pricing disequilibria adds an
important dimension to the debate as to whether return-predictability exists in
nancial markets. However, the returns to arbitrage in this setting, particularly
in the high-frequency domain, have not been explored.
6.2 - Contributions to the Literature
This section summarizes the theoretical and empirical contributions that this
thesis makes to the literature.
Chapter 3 is the rst work to endogenously characterize the important concept
of fundamental risk into a quantitative model of arbitrage trading. This chapter
introduces to the literature a model that makes use of the shape of the hyperbolic
tangent function to capture the idea that arbitrageurs grow increasingly sceptical
towards prices which continue to diverge away from fundamental values after an
arbitrage trade is initiated. This model specication has its roots in Physics,
but is otherwise totally new to the literature on arbitrage. Moreover, the model
presented contains the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model, which is favoured by the extant
theoretical literature, as a special case.
Based on the model, several theoretical inferences can be drawn that complement
the existing empirical literature on the behaviour of arbitrageurs facing
fundamental risk, and quantify the ideas presented in the empirical literature
on fundamental risk discussed in Chapter 2: First, arbitrageurs who are averse
to fundamental risk exhibit a diminishing propensity to exploit increasingly large
mispricings away from parity. Second, aversion to fundamental risk precipitates
the gradual unwinding of losing trades far sooner than is implied given a complete164
condence in the pricing relationship. Empirically, it is shown that arbitrageurs'
prot-seeking is enhanced by aversion to fundamental risk, by way of prudent
position management in the face of what would otherwise be interpreted as highly
attractive trading opportunities.
Chapter 4 carries out the rst examination of a high frequency pairs trading
strategy in the stock-ADR market. The main empirical contribution of this work
is to show, in contrast to the prior literature, that arbitrage is successful at
exploiting pricing anomalies in this market, and is therefore an important part
of the price-correcting mechanism between stocks and ADRs.
Besides the main empirical result, this work also presents a number of key insights
into the role of arbitrage in enforcing parity between stocks and ADRs. While
there is clearly no fundamental risk inherent in stock-ADR arbitrage, arbitrageurs
do face signicant deterrents associated with exploiting pricing anomalies in this
market: First, because stocks and ADRs are virtually the same security and are
two-way fungible, mispricings in this market are small, and exist for a median
duration of less than 10 minutes. It is shown that stock-ADR arbitrage can only
be protably undertaken by those with the lowest transaction costs. Second,
arbitrageurs who choose to exploit the narrowest mispricings between stocks and
ADRs face signicant holding costs stemming from uncertainty toward the time
of price convergence. Pairs trading necessitates holding trading positions in both
the stock and ADR open while waiting for convergence, and so this uncertainty
acts as a deterrent to arbitrage.
Chapter 5 provides an empirical contribution to the literature by way of
uncovering the existence of sub-second exploitable pricing disequilibria stemming
from lead/lag eects across international index futures contracts. It also
contributes to the literature by employing a recent advance in the statistical
estimation of lagged correlation based on Homan et al. (2010), and applying165
it to analysing the lagged cross-correlation prole of futures contract data
time-stamped to the millisecond.
In so doing, this work nds, in contrast to the extant literature, that arbitrage
is successful at appropriating informational delays across markets. However,
such informational delays are only exploitable by those with direct access to
the exchanges, and who are nancially able to employ the most advanced
technological infrastructure with which to trade. To put this in some context,
the work presented here shows that the most protable trading opportunities
caused by geographical informational disequilibria rarely last for longer than 300
milliseconds.
6.3 - Implications of the Findings in this Thesis
This thesis provides a deeper understanding of the important relationship between
arbitrage and price eciency. Moreover, the specic contributions that this thesis
makes weigh in on a number of contemporary debates in Financial Economics.
The existence of protable disequilibria across international markets weighs in on
an age-old debate surrounding the existence of predictability in asset returns. In
particular, it contrasts assertions made in Fama (1965), Fama (1991), Fama and
French (1992), Fama (1995), and Ponti (1996, 2006) among many others within
the deep literature on asset returns. Not only can returns can be forecast, but
can be done so with accuracy in excess of 85%.
Furthermore, the work presented in this thesis reconciles a puzzle in the market
for cross-listed securities. Specically, how can the stock-ADR market exhibit a
high degree of price eciency when neither arbitrageurs (Miller and Morey (1996),
Suarez (2005), Gagnon and Karolyi (2010)) nor investors in each of the individual
markets (Werner and Kleidon (1996), Chen et al. (2009)) are incentivised to
correct pricing anomalies? The application of a pairs trading strategy as a166
mechanism of parity enforcement solves this puzzle. Put simply, the extant
literature had not considered the full range of tools available to arbitrageurs.
Under realistic transaction costs, this thesis shows that arbitrage can protably
exploit pricing anomalies in the UK stock-ADR market, a highly developed and
deeply liquid market in which by denition arbitrage opportunities are unlikely
to exist. By that measure, arbitrage is an important price-correction mechanism
in the market for cross-listed securities.
Overall, the conclusions presented in this thesis accord with the view asserted
in Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) that arbitrage opportunities exist to
incentivise arbitrageurs to correct pricing disequilibria. However, chapters 4 and
5 of this thesis nd that exploitable opportunities exist in the sub-minute and
sub-second space. It is unlikely that Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) had this
frequency in mind. The important implication here is that it is not surprising
that works which employ low-frequency data such as Kato et al. (1991), Wahab
and Lashgari (1992), and Park and Tavakkol (1994) conclude in favour of price
eciency and the preclusion of arbitrage as a parity enforcement mechanism.
6.4 - Limitations of this Work
This section outlines the limitations of the work presented in this thesis.
Because pairs trading entails keeping open one long and one short position, it
is therefore vulnerable as a strategy to institutional factors such as short-selling
bans. In particular, the empirical period over which the model presented in
chapter 3 is tested contains a 4-month period during which short-selling was
banned in nancial stocks in the UK. Nevertheless, the bulk of the empirical
period studied in this chapter had no such restrictions. Further, it could be
argued that while incorporating the short-selling ban would obviously impact
the numerical result of arbitrage prots, the theoretical and qualitative insights167
discussed in section 6.2 which form the main contributions of chapter 3 to the
literature would be unaected.
Furthermore, short-selling involves borrowing stock in order to sell, with the
promise of returning the stock to the owner in the future. In real markets, the
arrangement for borrowing stock is not trivial. An investor who wishes to short
stocks must request a specic amount of stock from a broker before the start
of trading each day, and the broker in turn attempts to nd this stock either
from inventory or long-term institutional investors. It is not uncommon with less
liquid stocks that the requested amount of stock is unavailable, and this would
aect the empirical results presented in chapter 4 as it would hinder the ability of
arbitrageurs to exploit stock-ADR mispricings. Nevertheless, it is shown that the
rms upon which this study is based are highly liquid, such that the likelihood
of no short-stock availability is negligible.
Finally, in order for general inferences to be valid, the length of the historical
data period under empirical examination should be suciently long, so as to
include a range of market settings relevant to the main research questions. The
length of each of the data periods in chapters 4 and 5 are four and two months,
respectively. However, each of these chapters is concerned with phenomena that
occur primarily in the high-frequency domain, and between them, include a
number of price observations in the hundreds of millions, and a total number
of data points in the billions. It could be argued that these chapters analyse a
richer set of historical data even than that of chapter 3, which includes 9 years
of daily price observations.
6.5 - Avenues for Future Research
The applicability of the model presented in chapter 3 to future research in the
study of arbitrage behaviour is twofold: First, it demonstrably admits price168
dynamics rich enough to simulate a wide range of price behaviour. Second, the
specication of the model is simple enough to yield closed-form solutions to an
arbitrageur's portfolio optimization problem. Such a model would be desirable
for study in a general-equilibrium framework, wherein both the arbitrageur's
trading strategy, and that strategy's eect on the wider market, is studied jointly.
General-equilibrium models do not readily admit closed-form solutions (Xiong,
2001) due to the complexity of modelling the eect of trading behaviour on price
formation. Thus, incorporating a rich but simple model, such as that presented
in Chapter 3, would be useful to future research in this area.
It would be informative to apply the pairs trading strategy examined in chapter 4
to other markets, particularly South American stock-ADR markets. This would
complement research by Hong and Susmel (2003), Rabinovitch et al. (2003),
Grammig et al. (2005), and Grossman et al. (2007), who study the prevalence
of stock-ADR arbitrage in a number of dierent countries. The appeal of
applying a pairs trading strategy to these markets is threefold: First, pairs trading
circumvents country-specic institutional restrictions on the conversion between
stocks and ADRs (discussed in Rabinovitch et al. (2003), Puthenpurackal (2006),
and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010)). Therefore, applying a pairs trading strategy
would add a new and important dimension to the study of whether arbitrage is
successful at eliminating pricing disequilibria in these markets. Second, South
American trading hours overlap US trading hours almost entirely, and would
hence provide a deep source of empirical data on which to test the prevalence
of arbitrage. Third, these markets provide an excellent platform on which to
test what and to what extent the risks inherent in emerging economies act as
deterrents to arbitrage.
Chapter 5 provided the rst implementation of the modied Hayashi-Yoshida
correlation estimator (Hayashi and Yoshida (2005) and Homan et al. (2010)) to
study correlations across international markets. This work provides a platform169
upon which both theoretical and empirical advances could be made. Empirically,
the same methodology could readily be applied in a much wider setting, covering
not only geographical informational disequilibria, but also futures contracts of
dierent maturities, and the relationship between futures and exchange-traded
funds. On the theoretical front, this work motivates the need to expand the
Hayashi-Yoshida estimator to study lead/lag eects in more than two dimensions
(i.e. more than one leader per lagger). One application of this is to facilitate
the study of whether information stemming from two or more disparate markets
is pertinent to a third. Under the premise that global markets are increasingly
integrated (Ayuso and Blanco (2001), Kearney and Lucey (2004), Evans and
Hnatkovska (2005)), it is important to analyse not just the pair-wise transmission
of price shocks, but rather the eect of price shocks on all markets jointly.Blank Page171
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